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I.  INTRODUCTION
In  a  1975  article,  Laurence  Tribe  explored  how  three  separate  puzzles  of
constitutional law might seem more solvable  when viewed together. 1  It was an arresting
claim,  especially  as puzzle  designers  ratchet  up  levels of difficulty  when  they combine
two or more puzzles into one.2  Tribe's use of joint riddles to  solve problems is mirrored
in recent scientific work joining computational biology and genetics.  Scientists  in those
fields proceed with  the hope that a difficult problem can be understood,  if not resolved,
by  locating  it  as  a  part  of a  bigger  problem. 3   In  that  hope,  and  inspired  by  the
scholarship  and advocacy  of  Professor Tribe, I tackle  here quandaries of constitutional
change  surrounding  the  constitutionality of public  funding  for private  schools-where
the  funding  scheme  excludes  religious  schools.  Three  puzzles  become  unavoidable:
How can  the demands  of both  the Establishment  and Free  Exercise  clause  be satisfied;
*  Jeremiah  Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law  School.  Special thanks to Cass Sunstein, Robert Post, and
Reva Siegel for helpful  comments, and to Larry Tribe for friendship and inspiration.
1.  Laurence  H.  Tribe,  Childhood, Suspect Classifications,  and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked
Riddles, 39  L. & Contemp. Probs. 8 (1975).
2.  Bob Armstrong, Earliest Use of  Special Techniques  for Making Adult Jigsaw  Puzzles, 3 Game & Puzzle
Collectors Q. (2002).  One jigsaw puzzle, advertised as the most difficult in the world, is described this way:
This is no ordinary jigsaw puzzle!  It's an insane, double  sided puzzle which  has the  same artwork
on  both  sides,  but  offset  900  from  each  other.  This  puzzle  is  made  from  fine  linen  paper and
premium  brand  board  that's  distinctively  tinted  to  showcase  its  quality  and  thickness.  Buffalo
Games  uses environmentally  friendly soy based inks.  Each piece  is easy  to hold, easy to see,  and
"snaps"  together.  Pieces come within a poly-bag and shrink-wrapped box.
Cats 500pcs, http://www.hobbylinc.com/htm/buf/buf858.htm  (accessed  Feb. 25, 2007).
3.  Robert  L. Glass, Practical  Programmer:  Is This a Revolutionary Idea, or Not? 47 Commun.  ACM  23,
23-24  (2004)  (available  at  http://delivery.acm.org/10.I145/1030000/1029514/p23-
glass.html?key 1=1029514&key2=910202571  l&coll=&dl=GUIDE&CFID=l  5151515&CFTOKEN=6184618)
(exploring  possible  software  construction  by  simultaneous  work  on  parallel  behavior  trees-addressing
components (the  software pieces), states  (that those components  can take on),  events and decisions/constraints
(that  are  associated  with  the  components),  data  that the  components  exchange,  and  the causal,  logical,  and
temporal dependencies  (associated  with component interactions));  Edward  M.  Marcotte, Assembling a Jigsaw
Puzzle  with 20,000 Parts, 4  Genome  Biology  323  (2003)  (available  at  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
articlerender.fcgi?artid=193613)  (exploring  use  of algorithms  that  to  identify  peptides  from  experimental
peptide  fragmentation  spectra  in post-transformational  states  and  studies  of protein-protein  interactions  that
start with an algorithm that finds amino-acid sequences that pack well  into a fixed protein  structure,  and create
a new interface between  two DNA-binding domains of known structure).
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what does  respecting precedent mean when there is a recent reversal of one line of cases;
and when does federalism demand deference  to the supremacy of the federal constitution
or instead respect for state autonomy?
Although  he  addressed  childhood,  suspect  classifications,  and  conclusive
presumptions,  Professor  Tribe's  own  proposal  for  dealing  with  his  three  puzzles
reverberates  in  the  analysis  of  these  issues.  As  he  called  for  selective  judicial
invalidation  of  certain  conclusive  presumptions-ensuring  individualization  in
government  treatment  of minors  in  some  contexts-Professor  Tribe  characterized  his
approach  as  a  kind  of  "antidoctrine"  reflecting  social  and  political  transition,  moral
uncertainty, and marking how the courts would "facilitate, and take part in, the evolution
of  moral-and  thus  legal--consciousness. 'A  I  suggest  here  that  the  Constitution's
demands  will not be  resolved  through  a new  three-part  test or other doctrinal  solution,
but  instead  through  particularized  case-by-case  judicial  attention  to  the  cumulative
impact  of religious  schooling  on  the  character  of  the  nation  and  the  predicates  for
inclusive  democracy.  Even  though  case-by-case  decision-making  allows  for mistakes
and  produces  uncertainty,  it  also  permits  evolving  and  practical  responsiveness  to  the
multiple priorities relevant  to religion, schooling, and democracy.
II.  PUZZLE I: RELATING THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
The  first  puzzle  concerns  the  relationship  between  the Free  Exercise  Clause and
the Establishment  Clause in addressing  public  aid reaching religious  schools.  Without a
clear  answer  from  history,  text,  or  doctrine,  government  actors  must  somehow
simultaneously  protect  the free  exercise  of religion  by individuals,  even those  without
mainstream  practices,  and  avoid  making  any  law  "respecting"  the  establishment  of
religion.5   The  central  difficulty  arises  if a  government  official  or  agency  devises  an
accommodation,  exempting  members  of  a  particular  religion  from  an  otherwise-
4.  Tribe, supra n.  1, at 37.
5.  U.S.  Const.  amend.  I:  "Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of religion,  or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  Social, political, and legal changes  make the religion clauses  particularly
illustrative of the inevitability of changing constitutional interpretation.  Even if there were agreement about the
framers'  conceptions  of the  First Amendment's treatment  of religion, changes in society and government since
the  adoption  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  prevent  straight-line  continuity  of interpretation.  Justice  Brennan  has
emphasized  how  the  contemporary  religious  heterogeneity  far  surpasses  the  diversity  at  the  time  of the
founding  generation.  Sch.  Dist. of Abington Township v.  Schempp,  374  U.S.  203,  230  (1963)  (Brennan,  J.,
concurring).  As a result, Justice Brennan rejected  the very focus on  historical aims  and instead argued that for
an  inquiry  into  whether  the  challenged  practices  threaten  "those  consequences  which  the  Framers  deeply
feared;  whether,  in short, they  tend  to promote the type of interdependence  between religion  and  state which
the First Amendment was designed to prevent."  Id. at 236.  There is, of course,  far greater religious diversity in
the  United  States  now than  when Justice Brennan  wrote that opinion.  See generally Barry  A. Kosmin,  Egon
Mayer  &  Ariela  Keysar,  American  Religious  Identification  Survey  10,  http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty
/researchstudies/aris.pdf  (last updated  Dec.  19,  2001)  ("[T]he proportion  of the  [American]  population  that
can  be classified  as Christian has declined  from eighty-six  in  1990 to seventy-seven  percent  in 2001.").  This
trend  reflects both  growing presence of Muslims,  Hindus,  and  Buddhists, the  increasing  self-identification  of
Native Americans, and the rapidly rising  number of people who claim  no religious  identity.  See Diana  L.  Eck,
A  New Religious America: How a  "Christian Country" Has Become  the World's Most Religiously Diverse
Nation (Harper S.F.  2001); Cathy Grossman, Charting Unchurched  America, USA Today  01d (Mar.  7,  2007)
(Fourteen percent of the nation does not follow any organized religion, almost double the eight percent reported
in  1990.).  The  expansion  of government-producing  many  more  occasions  for  potential  contact  between
religion and government-is  another crucial  change.  See William W.  Van Alstyne, Constitutional  Separation
of  Church and  State'  The Quest fora Coherent  Position,  57 Am. Political  Sci. Rev. 865,  881  (1963).
[Vol. 42:911
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prevailing  rule6-for  that  very effort  to allow  free  exercise  of religion  could be  viewed
as  an  impermissible  preference. 7   Some  "play  in  the joints"  seems  necessary  for  the
commitments  both  to  free  exercise  and  to  avoiding  preference  for  religion,8  but  how
much?
This problem, difficult enough in the abstract, supplies the constitutional terrain for
decades  of intense  battles  over  public  aid  to  parochial  schools  in  the  United  States.
Parents  seeking  to  provide  religious  education  for  their  children  are  assured  that
prerogative,9  but  governments  seeking  to  assist  those  parents,  or  merely  to  provide  a
"level  playing field" rather than a government preference  for secular instruction, run into
the Establishment  Clause.  Whether in the form of subsidies for teachers  and materials or
tuition  relief for students,  public  aid  to parochial  schools  for  several decades  triggered
judicially-enforced Establishment Clause barriers  on two grounds:  1) Public money must
not directly  reach pervasively  sectarian  institutions;  and  2)  Public  aid must not  even
indirectly  reach parochial  schools  if that  would  allow  diversion of funds into  religious
indoctrination.
This  strict separationist  view, developed  in the mid-twentieth  century, did not halt
continuing  efforts  to  provide  aid  to  religious  schools  or  parents  selecting  them-and
constitutional  arguments  on  their behalf.11  Pro-aid  forces  can  mount  a  free  exercise-
style  objection  for  interfering  with  the option  of religious  schooling  that  some  parents
may believe  necessary  or  desirable. 12  Especially  where the  local  or state  government
finances public  schools, a special burden falls on parents or students who must pay out of
their own pockets  if they  seek to combine  schooling with  religious  instruction  for their
children.  This burden  on  individual  choice  becomes  especially pronounced  where  the
government  offers  funds to  individuals  choosing  private  education  but  only if it is  not
religious:
The  selective  denial  discourages  religious-school  choices  and,  at  least  prima  facie,
communicates disfavor of them  ....  [A]  satisfactory K-12 education in math, English, and
history  in  a  religious  school  imparts  secular  knowledge  and  provides  significant  secular
6.  Hobbie v. Unempl. Apps.  Commn., 480 U.S.  136,  144-45 (1987);  Sherbert v.  Verner, 374 U.S.  398, 409
(1963).  Recently,  a  public school  coach  faced  the  conflict  when the  school  board,  following complaints  by
some parents,  prohibited  his participation  in student-led  team prayers; a  district court judge  concluded that the
coach  could participate-but  did  so  in  part  by suggesting  that  the  coach  would  not  be  praying  but  instead
providing leadership for the  team.  See Associated  Press, Court's Call: N.J. Coach Can 'Take a Knee'  While
Team Prays, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=  17207 (July 27, 2006).
7.  The preference  could  seem to run  to members  of a  particular  religion or to  religion  in general;  either
would run afoul of the Establishment  Clause.
8.  See Walz  v.  Tax Commn. of the City of N. Y., 397  U.S. 664, 668-69  (1970)  ("[T]here  is room for play in
the  joints  productive  of  a  benevolent  neutrality  which  will  permit  religious  exercise  to  exist  without
[governmental]  sponsorship and without interference.").
9.  See  Wis.  v.  Yoder, 406  U.S.  205  (1972);  Pierce v. Soc. of  Sisters, 268  U.S.  510 (1925).  Both of these
cases  invoke  substantive  due  process  as  a  frame  for  the  parental  right,  but  both  also  reflect  free  exercise
considerations.
10.  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487  U.S.  589, 609-10  (1988).  Four members  of the  Court rejected  this view  in a
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.  793, 809-10  (2000).
11.  Starting with Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Township of  Ewing, 330 U.S.  1 (1947),  the Supreme Court
interpreted  the  Establishment  Clause  to guard  the  governmental  raising  of tax  revenues  to support  religious
instruction or institutions.
12.  See Thomas  C.  Berg  & Douglas  Laycock,  The Mistakes in Locke  v.  Davey and the Future of State
Payments for  Services Provided  by Religious Institutions, 40 Tulsa L.  Rev.  227 (2004).
2007]
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value to society-yet  a state exclusion of religious schools withholds benefits  even for that
unquestionable  educational  contribution.  The  family  is not merely  denied  assistance  for
religious teaching,  but is penalized  for choosing to pursue  its child's basic  K-12 education •  13
in a religious setting.
Governments  act unacceptably  if they target  specific religious  groups for disapproval.
14
Historic  antagonism  over  Catholic  schools  exacerbates  the  potential  constitutional
difficulty  with school subsidy programs that exclude  religious  schools by suggesting an
impermissible  animus  motivated the statutory and constitutional rules against any public
dollars  ever  reaching  a  private religious  school. 15  The  exclusion of religious  schools
from  the  set  of educational  options  accorded  public  funding  could  raise  constitutional
concerns on both free exercise and viewpoint discrimination grounds. 
16
The chief defense that governments  supply  after excluding  religious  schools from
funding available  to other  schools is their concern to avoid violating legal restrictions on
government  aid  to  religion.  This  defense  crumbles  if the  Establishment  Clause  is  re-
interpreted  to permit public funds to reach pervasively sectarian parochial  schools  when
part  of a general,  neutral  scheme;  indeed,  then the  strict separation  approach  becomes
unnecessary-and  the  tension  with  free  exercise,  viewpoint  discrimination,  and  the
prohibition  against  targeting  religions  for  negative  treatment  each  disappear.  The
general  scheme could offer aid for  secular activities  at any school, or aid to parents and
students who select any accredited school-including  a religious one.  Arguably, through
such  programs,  the  government  would not  be  endorsing  or advancing  religion  or  any
particular  religion.  Instead,  a  general  scheme  through  which  the  government  makes
books and computers available to all schools,  or extends vouchers to parents who select a
13.  Thomas  C. Berg,  Why  a State  Exclusion  of Religious  Schools from  School  Choice  Programs  Is
Unconstitutional, 2 First Amend.  L.  Rev.  23,  27  (2003).  An early effort  to develop this  argument  appears  in
Michael  W, McConnell,  The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,  104 Harv.  L.  Rev.
989,  1017-18,  1046-47 (1991).  For an argument that rights of religious people  in general face greater threats
in the  United  States  than  rights  of secularists,  see  Joseph  P. Viteritti,  The Last Freedom:  Religion from  the
Public School to the Public Square (Princeton U. Press 2007).
14.  Church of  Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of  Hialeah,  508 U.S.  520 (1993).
15.  See generally Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy.  U. Chi.
L.J.  121  (2001).  Moreover,  the  exclusion of religious  schools  from public subsidy programs  may  seem to or
actually  fall  most  heavily  on  poor urban  students  of  color,  who  face  either failing  public  schools  or better
parochial  (usually  Catholic)  private  schools.  See  generally Joseph  P. Viteritti,  Choosing  Equality:  School
Choice,  the  Constitution,  and Civil Society (Brookings  Instn.  2001).  Catholic  schools  started  largely  as  an
effort to maintain  religious identity and avoid  "an  unwelcome  assimilation,"  McConnell, supra n. 13,  at  1043,
but "[ilt would  be difficult to prove that the government's  only reason for continuing to refuse to fund religious
schools is to induce religious assimilation."  Id. at  1045.
16.  On  free  exercise,  see  Nathan  Lewin,  How  School  Vouchers  Can  Win  in  the  Supreme  Court:
Distinguishing  "What"  from  "How"  in  Aid  to  Religious  Schools,  http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/
SchoolVouchers.html  (accessed  Feb. 25,  2007).  On  viewpoint discrimination,  see  Good News  Club v. Milford
C.  Sch.,  533 U.S. 98  (2001); Rosenberger v.  Rector & Visitors of  the U. of Va.,  515 U.S.  819 (1995);  Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S.  263  (1981).  In each  instance,  a  public university or school  had excluded religious  groups
from using the  institution's space or resources  and explained such exclusions  as efforts to avoid Establishment
Clause  violations,  and  in  each  case,  the  Court  rejected  the  Establishment  Clause  rationale,  and  found  the
exclusionary policies  forms of impermissible  viewpoint discrimination,  violating the free  speech  guarantee of
the Constitution.  For an  argument  that this equal  treatment approach undermines  the  special significance  of
religion  by  equating  religious  expression  with  any  other  kind  of  expression,  see  Derek  H.  Davis,  A
Commentary  on  the  Supreme  Court's  "Equal  Treatment"  Doctrine as  the New  Constitutional Paradigm for
Protecting Religious Liberty,  46  J. Church  &  St.  717,  735-36  (2004).  See  generally Equal  Treatment  of
Religion in a Pluralistic Society (Stephen  V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., Eerdmans Publg. Co. 1998).
(Vol. 42:911
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parochial  school  from  a set of school options,  advances  equal regard  for religious  and
secular options.
This is undeniably  a period  of shifting judicial treatment of religion in the United
States,  with  particularly  unsettled  results  for  both  the  analysis  of  and  outcomes  in
Establishment  Clause  challenges  to  government  action.  Federal  courts  have  recently
approved  decisions by governments  to provide religious groups access to programs open
to  others  and  rejected  governmental  exclusions  of  religious  groups  from  generally
available  public  resources. 17   For example,  the  Court  found  no  Establishment  Clause
problem with  a school voucher program, allowing  low-income parents  to select religious
schools  from among  a range of schooling options.18  A fractured Court permitted public
display  of the  Ten  Commandments  in  one  setting but  not in  another. 19  As a  sign  of
shifting  priorities,  the  Department  of  Justice  Civil  Rights  Division  under  the
administration  of President  George  W.  Bush  devoted  resources  to  challenge  religious
discrimination  while  reducing  attention  to  racial  discrimination.  A  closely  divided
Court closed off the  avenue for taxpayers to  challenge  the White House Office  of Faith-
Based  and  Community  Initiatives, which  plaintiffs had  argued  steered public  funds  to
groups with strong political affiliations.
21
The  Supreme  Court  did  hold  onto  one  remnant  of the  old  separatist  view  by
stressing  that parents,  not  state  actors,  selected  the  religious  schools  from the range  of
schooling  options.22   Now, the  question  left  open  is  whether  the federal  Constitution
demands the inclusion of religious schools in a voucher program--or demands public aid
to  facilitate  the selection  of parochial  schooling,  when  public  support  is available  for
other  kinds  of  schooling.  Now  allowed  by  the  Establishment  Clause,  are  voucher
programs that encompass religious schools compelled even in cities and states that prefer
to  confine  school  voucher  programs  to nonreligious  schools?23  Exclusion  of religious
17.  See  e.g.  Good News  Club,  533  U.S.  98;  Rosenberger, 515  U.S.  819;  Widmar,  454  U.S.  263.  In each
instance,  a  public  university  or school  had  excluded  religious  groups  from  using  the institution's  space  or
resources and explained such  exclusions as efforts  to avoid Establishment  Clause violations, and in each case,
the  Court  rejected  the  Establishment  Clause  rationale,  and  found  the  exclusionary  policies  forms  of
impermissible  viewpoint  discrimination,  violating  the  free  speech  guarantee  of the  Constitution.  For  an
argument  that  this  equal  treatment  approach  undermines  the  special  significance  of  religion  by  equating
religious expression with any other kind of expression,  see Davis, supra n.  16,  at 235-36.
18.  Zelman  v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.  639 (2002).
19.  See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. Times Al  (June  28,
2005).
20.  Neil  A.  Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil Rights Mission, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/
washington/14discrim.html?ei=5088&en=58a474d3b5dc75df&ex=1  339473600&partner=rs&pagewanted=all
(June  14, 2007).
21.  The Court ruled  5-4 that the  challengers lacked  standing to sue  because  the  funds came from  general
appropriations,  not specific legislation.  Hein v.  Freedom from Religion Found,  127  S.  Ct. 2553  (2007).  Two
members  of the Court indicated  that they would  overturn  the precedent authorizing taxpayers'  suits  in specific
Establishment Clause contexts.  The practical effect of the decision  will be to permit the executive  to promote
funding to religious groups without judicial oversight.  See Michael  Kranish,  Court Bars Suit on Faith-Based
Plan, Boston Globe  Al  (June 26,  2007).  Each  of the opinions  in the case underscore the  enforcement barriers
that accompany Establishment Clause challenges to the use of public appropriations.
22.  Zelman, 536 U.S.  639.
23.  See David Heim,  Vouch for It?-School Voucher Plans and Religious  Schools, Christian Cent. (July 29,
1998)  (available  at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is-n21_vl15/ai_21043675/pg  1).  The Florida
Supreme  Court  declined  to  embrace  similar  free  exercise  arguments  offered  to  defend  the  country's  first
statewide  school  choice  program;  the  Florida  Opportunity  Scholarships  violated  the  state  constitution's
2007)
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schools from public  aid looked not only permissible but required when the base-line was
strict separation  between religion  and government across  all  kinds of settings;  but now
that public  bodies  can  fund vouchers redeemable  at  religious  schools,  the exclusion  of
religious  schools  from local  schemes  may  come  to  be seen  as  an  expression  of unfair
discrimination  or impermissible animus.
III.  PUZZLE II: RESPECTING  PRECEDENT WHEN  THE COURT REVERSES A PRECEDENT
The  second  puzzle  arises  from  the  continually  difficult  subject of stare  decisis:
When  should  and when must a court  adhere  to its prior decisions,  given  the competing
goods  of predictability-which  enhances  liberty,  fairness,  and  the  rule  of law24-and
flexibility  due  to  changing  circumstances  and  evolving  understandings  of justice?  An
acute  version  of Puzzle  Two  emerges  when  the  Supreme  Court  reverses  a  precedent;
then, in the name of stare decisis,  how strongly should courts adhere to and extend a new
decision  reversing  prior precedent,  and how  much instead should judges  pace doctrinal
change by adhering to prior precedents in neighboring areas?25
This  puzzle  is especially  evident  since  the  recent treatment  of the  Establishment
Clause, which one commentator  describes as "the crumbling  wall of separation between
church and state," 26 a collapse increasingly permitting public aid to religious  schools.  In
1997,  the  Court overturned an earlier decision that  forbade publicly paid teachers  to go
onto  parochial  school  premises  to  teach  remedial  reading  and  instead  ruled  that even
direct  aid  to  a  religious  school  could  comply  with  the  Establishment  Clause.27  A
plurality  opinion  in 2000 produced  a  dramatically  different analysis  that would  permit
public resources  to reach religious schools as long as the aid itself would be secular and
would proceed in a neutral manner, available to public  and private,  secular and religious
schools,28 but this view did not persuade  a majority of the Court.  Other Justices  writing
"uniformity" clause guaranteeing  all  state students  a "uniform,  efficient, safe,  secure,  and high quality  system
of  free  public"  education.  See  Lisa  Knepper,  Florida Supreme  Court Strikes  Down  School  Choice,
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/l_5_06pr.html  (last updated Jan. 5, 2006).
24.  See Planned Parenthood  v. Casey, 505 U.S.  833,  844 (1992)  (plurality)  ("Liberty  finds no refuge  in a
jurisprudence of doubt.").
25.  An  external  perspective  on  the  Supreme  Court would  of course  emphasize  the  effects  of changing
membership on the stability of precedent.  So would a journalistic perspective.  See Linda Greenhouse & David
D. Kirkpatrick, Justices  Loosen Ad Restrictions in Campaign Law, N.Y. Times Al,  A18 (June 26, 2007); Linda
Greenhouse,  Vote  Against Banner Shows  Divide on Speech  in Schools, N.Y.  Times  A18  (June  26,  2007)
(relating revision  of 2003  decision  to changing  Court membership).  For a cogent discussion  about  internalist
and  extemalist  perspectives,  see  Mark  Tushnet,  Review:  The  New  Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law,
Politics, or What? 66 U. Chi. L. Rev.  1061  (1999).
26.  Amit Patel, The Orthodoxy Opening Predicament: The Crumbling Wall of  Separation between Church
and  State, 83  U.  Det. Mercy L.  Rev.  195 (2006).  Another author asserts that a recent decision "razed the wall"
between  Church and  State.  Jason  S.  Marks,  Only a "Speed Bump " Separating  Church and State? 57  J.  Mo.
Bar I (Jan.-Feb.  2001)  (available at http://www.mobar.org/joumal/2001/janfeb/marks.htm)  (discussing how  the
plurality  opinion in Mitchell v. Helms would overrule  both the result and the reasoning of Meek v. Pittinger  and
Wolman v.  Walter,  dispense with the  long-standing distinction between  indirect government aid (permitted) and
direct  government  aid to  religious  institutions (forbidden),  and focus  solely on  whether "the  aid  itself has  an
impermissible  content"  rather  than  whether  it  allows  funds  to  be  diverted  to  support  religious  practice  or
indoctrination).  Justices  Scalia and Thomas  are ready to overturn other precedents  in the religion context.  See
e.g. Hein, 127  S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
27.  Agostini v. Felton,  521  U.S.  203 (1997)  (overturning Aguilar  v. Felton,  473 U.S. 402  (1985)).
28.  See generally Mitchell, 530  U.S.  793.  The Court  had  already  reopened  an  older  case  and  reversed
course,  permitting  federally  funded remedial  instruction  to  take place  on  the  site of a parochial  school.  See
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separately  urged  retention  of key  elements  of the  separationist  doctrinal  inquiry  into
whether  the  government  is  impermissibly  giving  direct  aid  to  religious  practice  or
indoctrination. 29   In 2002,  a full  majority  of the  Court upheld  a city  program  funding
school  vouchers  used  primarily  in  religious  schools,30  but  the  opinion  for  the  Court
included  many  qualifications,  confining  the  decision  to  retain  elements  of  the
separationist  view.  Commentators  since  have  understandably  disagreed  whether these
cases  amount  to  revolutionary  change  or  small  nuances.3 1   The  decisions  leave
unanswered  basic questions  about the relationship  between  public funding  and religious
schools,  including  whether  a  public  funding  program  must include  religious  schools
when other schools are eligible, 32  and whether adherence  to the new precedents  ends the
rigorous scrutiny associated with the separationist  approach and replaces  it with a neutral
treatment analysis.
However  these  questions  will  be  resolved,  the Court  and  commentators  will be
reacting  to  the confusion  created  by  prior legal  doctrine.  The  older  precedents  direct
judicial  inquiry, first announced  in Lemon  v. Kurtzman,33  into whether  the government
aid  directly  and  impermissibly  funds  religious  practice  or  indoctrination,  or  instead
permissibly provides indirect assistance, allows individuals to choose religious programs,
or supports  solely secular activities without shifting fungible funds to religious activities.
Agostini, 521  U.S.  203  (reversing prior judgment  in Aguilar, 473  U.S. 402, and  its companion  case, Sch. Dist.
of  Grand  Rapids v. Ball, 473  U.S. 373 (1985)).
29  Mitchell, 530  U.S. at 836 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
30.  Zelman,  536  U.S.  639.  Many  factors  contributed  to the  Supreme  Court's  approval  of  the  voucher
scheme in Zelman:
1) it covered only disadvantaged students;
2)  in a dismally failing public  school district;
3) it included genuine secular options;
4) it offered no financial  incentives for selecting the religious schools over other options; and
5) it offered public aid only indirectly, after parents selected the religious school
Id. at 662.  And Justice O'Connor, while not confining her vote in the five-person majority to the reasons stated
in her concurring  opinion, did additionally  emphasize these features:
6)  the  support that  the Cleveland  voucher  program  provides  religious  institutions  support  is  not
substantial  and that is not atypical of other existing government programs.
Id. at 668  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring).  It is far from clear why the first two factors offer any  resolution of the
religious clause questions, even though  they well explain by the political  support for the  voucher program and
some of the motivation  for change  in judicial resistance to aid to religious schools.
31.  Compare  Barbara  Bradley  Hagerty,  ADF  a  Force  behind  Conservative  Court  Victories,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-4633563  (Sept.  10,  2007)  (Jordan  Lorance  of Alliance
Defense Fund sees "180-degree  change"  in the Supreme  Court's treatment  of Establishment  Clause challenges)
with  Richard E.  Morgan,  The Failure of the Rehnquist Court, Claremont Inst.  3 (Spring  2006)  (available  at
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.l007/article_detail.asp)  (seeing only  small  course  corrections  in
Establishment Clause cases).
32.  The public funding may be  for tuition  vouchers or instead it may take the  form of a tax  credit.  Further
questions  arise  when  the  school  options  include  public  charter  schools  organized  as  religious  schools.  See
Mary Elizabeth  Hill Hanchey, Resisting Efforts to Provide Public  Funding  for Parochial  Education  in Wake  of
Zelman  v.  Simmons-Harris:  A  Primer  for North  Carolina Advocates,  1 First  Amend.  L.  Rev.  85,  104-10
(2003)  (considering how  possible creation  of publicly-chartered  religious  schools raises  the  problem of direct
aid  to parochial  school  on  a  per-pupil basis;  revising the  charter  school  to  give funding to  parents who  then
choose the religious charter schools  could avoid constitutional  problem).
33.  403 U.S.  602 (1971).
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Using  these  inquiries,  the  Supreme  Court  produced  a  notoriously  inconsistent  set  of
decisions interpreting the Establishment  Clause,34 while states and localities tested these
legal limits and tried to accommodate parents selecting religious schools.
Justices  O'Connor  and  Breyer reinforced  these precedents  and the Lemon test in
supplying  the  crucial  votes  requiring  the  inclusion  of religious  schools  in  the  public
subsidy program at issue  in Mitchell v. Helms.35  There, Justices  O'Connor  and Breyer
reasoned that  while  neutrality  in  the  sense  of evenhandedness  and  secular  content  are
relevant  to  Establishment  Clause  inquiries,  a  program  would  remain  defective  if  it
permitted  diversion  of resources  to  give  direct  support  to  religious  indoctrination,  or
lacked  the  intervention  of a  private  individual  choosing  to  use  the  resources  for  that
purpose.36  The  four  other members  of the  Court who  agreed  with  this result  pushed
instead for the new test for government neutrality  in offering aid of secular content; this
would suffice, in their view, to satisfy the Establishment Clause and no court would need
to  ask  whether  aid  reaches  schools  that  are  pervasively  sectarian  or  whether  the  aid
allows  religious  schools  to  divert  funds  to  purely  religious  activities.37   Laying  the
ground for the Court's later decision to permit inclusion of religious schools in a voucher
program,  the plurality opinion reasoned that "if the government,  seeking to further some
legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all
who  adequately  further that  purpose,.  . . then  it  is  fair  to  say  that  any  aid going  to  a
religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular purpose."
38
When the full Court majority, over four dissents, later approved the school voucher
program,  the  crucial  concurring  opinion  by  Justice  O'Connor  still  preserved  the
distinction between direct  and indirect aid-and emphasized  that the program placed the
government  aid  in  the  hands  of parents,  who  then  could  make  their  own  choice  of
34.  Over a  dozen Supreme Court cases between  1968  and 2005  address public aid to nonpublic education in
light of the religion clauses.  See Geoffrey R. Stone,  Louis M. Seidman,  Cass R. Sunstein & Mark V. Tushnet,
Constitutional  Law  1531  (5th  ed.,  Aspen 2005).  Seeking  to  stop public  aid from  supporting a pervasively
religious institution,  the Court  disallowed: Aid to parochial schools  for supplementing  salaries of teachers of
secular subjects; aid for counseling, testing,  and psychological  services, speech  and hearing therapy; teaching
and related services tax credits for low-income parents and tax deduction  for high-income parents each  sending
their children to parochial schools;  and reimbursement of costs involved in administered  state tests at parochial
schools.  See Meek v. Pittlnger,  421  U.S.  349 (1975);  Comm. for Pub. Edu. v. Nyquest, 413  U.S.  756  (1973);
Levitt v.  Comm. for Pub, Educ.,  413 U.S.  472 (1973);  Lemon, 403  U.S.  602.  The notion of strict  separation
reflected  both a kind of anti-contamination  principle  and  also a practical  economic  idea  that relieving  the
burden  of the  secular activities  from  the  religious  school's  budget  so  remaining  funds  could be  devoted  to
religious activities. The Court over the  same time period permitted public aid in the  form of secular textbooks
loaned to parochial schools, public school personnel administering at neutral sites diagnostic tests and services
for  parochial school  students;  and  reimbursement  of costs associated  with state-mandated  tests.  Comm. for
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.  646 (1980);  Wolman v.  Walter, 433  U.S.  229 (1977);  Bd.  of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236  (1968).
35.  530 U.S.  at 836 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ.,  concurring).
36.  Id.  at 840-44.
37.  Id.  at 801.  Here the plurality marked a transition, using elements of the test from Lemon, 403 U.S.  602,
while  moving  toward  an  equal  treatment  approach.  Establishing the  line between  permitted  and  forbidden
government  support  benefiting parochial  schools  proved difficult  to  draw,  as  did  the  relationship  between
forbidden  and required accommodation of religious free exercise.  The Lemon test inspired so  many criticisms
that one author announced, "Lemon is Dead."  Michael  Stokes Paulsen, Lemon  is Dead, 43  Case  W. Res. L.
Rev.  795  (1993).  By  1993,  five  members  of the  Supreme  Court  condemned  the  Lemon  test.  See Lamb's
Chapel  v.  C. of Moriches Union Free Sch.  Dist.,  508  U.S.  384,  399-400  (1993)  (Scalia  & Thomas,  JJ.,
concurring).
38.  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at  810.
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religious  or secular schools.39  Since the  deciding vote was cast  by  a Justice who  is  no
longer  on  the  Court,  the  status  of these  distinctions  to  future  Establishment  Clause
analysis  remains  in doubt.  This period of change  and  transition  on  the Court  signals
shifting  political  and  moral  views  as  well  as  changing  legal  doctrine,  with  inevitable
dialogue between past and present without generating a new dominant view.41
Changes  in judicial  treatment  of the Free  Exercise  Clause  have  been  if anything
more  sweeping.  The  Court's  decision  in  Employment Division v.  Smith  completely
replaced  strict scrutiny with a rational  basis analysis of generally applicable laws.42  Yet
even the new Free  Exercise analysis  does  not answer how to  treat a scheme,  ostensibly
general,  that  substantially  skews  private  choices  toward  religious  schools.
43   Such  a
scheme  could  raise  Establishment  Clause  concerns  about  government  action  that  a
reasonable  observer would view as  a governmental endorsement of religion in general  or
of a particular religion.44  When  combined with the still uncertain  scope of the changing
39.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J.,  concurring).  Justice  O'Connor, whose  vote was necessary  for
the majority, wrote separately and emphasized that "Cleveland  parents who use vouchers  to send their  children
to religious private schools do so as a result of true private choice"  from an  array including nonreligious public
and community schools.  Id.
40.  For  a  prediction,  see  Joseph  N.  Knippenberg,  John Roberts  on  Church and State:  A  Speculative
Reconstruction, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/knippenberg/05/roberts.htm  (last updated Aug. 2005).
41.  Cf  Tribe,  supra  n.  1, at  25  (describing  shifting  views  about  sex  roles  and  parenting,  without  a
crystallizing moral consensus).
42.  Compare  Smith,  494  U.S.  872  (halting  heightened  scrutiny  to  the  government's  refusal  to  grant
exemptions  to  generally  applicable  laws  that  unintentionally  burden  religious  beliefs  or  practices)  with
Sherbert,  374  U.S.  398  (requiring  strict  scrutiny  of  employment  compensation  rule  which  failed  to
accommodate an individual who observed the Sabbath on Saturday).
43.  The  possibility  that  financial  incentives  would  skew  private  choices  toward  the  religious  option
concerned  even the  Court's majority in  Zelman,  where  the  Justices  in  the  majority simply concluded that  the
array of choice  and financial terms produced no such impermissible effect.  536 U.S.  at 622-23.
44.  In  Zelman, 536  U.S.  at  654-55,  Chief Justice  Rehnquist's  opinion  dealt  with  an  objection  on  this
ground by indicating  the facts did not support it:
Respondents  suggest that even without a financial incentive for parents to choose a religious school,
the  program creates  a "public  perception that the State  is endorsing  religious practices  and beliefs."
But  we have repeatedly  recognized  that  no reasonable  observer  would  think  a neutral  program of
private  choice,  where  state  aid  reaches  religious  schools  solely  as  a  result  of  the  numerous
independent  decisions  of private  individuals,  carries  with  it  the  imprimatur  of  government
endorsement.  The  argument  is  particularly  misplaced  here  since  "the  reasonable  observer  in the
endorsement  inquiry  must be deemed  aware"  of the  "history and  context" underlying  a challenged
program.  Any objective  observer  familiar with  the  full  history  and context of the  Ohio  program
would  reasonably  view  it as  one  aspect of a broader undertaking  to  assist poor  children  in failed
schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.
Id.  (citations  omitted).  Justice  O'Connor  introduced  the  reasonable  observer  perspective  to  assess  such
skewing and also  to assess  when the  government  impermissibly  endorses religion.  See  e.g. Rosenberger,  515
U.S. at  848 (O'Connor, J.,  concurring).
In  Witters  v.  Wash.  Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474  U.S.  481  (1986),  for example,  we unanimously
held that the  State may, through a generally applicable financial  aid  program, pay a blind student's
tuition  at a  sectarian  theological  institution.  The Court  so held, however, only  after emphasizing
that "vocational  assistance provided under the  Washington  program is paid directly  to the student,
who transmits it to the educational  institution of his or her choice."  The benefit to religion under the
program, therefore,  is akin to a public servant contributing her government  paycheck to the church.
We thus  resolved the  conflict  between the  neutrality  principle  and the  funding prohibition, not by
permitting  one to trump the  other, but by relying  on the elements  of choice  peculiar to the  facts  of
that case:  "The aid to religion at issue here is the  result of petitioner's  private choice.  No reasonable
observer  is likely  to draw from the  facts  before us  an inference  that the  State itself is endorsing  a
religious practice or belief."
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interpretation  of  the  Establishment  Clause,  developments  in  Free  Exercise  doctrine
further complicate  the task of a court determined  to follow  precedent strictly.45  Which
line should remain  fixed in the judicial decision-making:  The line outlawing  general aid
programs  that exclude  religious  schools,  or the  line  rejecting  government  policies  that
push people into religion?
The Court  has  made room  for greater  public  support of religious  institutions than
in the past, but left uncertain  when such public support ought to be compelled, and if so,
whether  the  governing  theory  would  be  Free  Exercise  of religion  (because  exclusion
from  public  resources  would  unduly  burden  such  private  exercise),  or  instead  Free
Speech  (forbidding  viewpoint  discrimination)  or  Equal  Protection  (forbidding
discrimination on the basis of religion).  If viewpoint discrimination and equal protection
provide  a basis  for challenging  the  exclusion  of religious  groups from public  support,
prior  decisions  treating  religion  differently  from  other  subjects  would  also  be  cast in
doubt.46  The ripples of change  from revisions in religion doctrines  spill over into other
areas  of constitutional  analysis  without  an  obvious  stopping  point  for  constitutional
change.
IV.  PUZZLE III: FEDERALISM
The third puzzle involves federalism, a term whose own ambivalent  legal meaning
hints  at the  tension.  Federalism-a  system of governing  divided  between  central  and
local authorities-can  emphasize decentralization,  with national  authority  committed to
recognizing and at many points deferring  to state and local governments.  But federalism
can  also  stress  the  significance  of the  central  government  as  the  overarching  system,
binding  the  states  and  localities  into  a  whole  and  requiring  their  acceptance  of  the
national government as the supreme and final authority.  The two meanings of federalism
reflect  the dual  faces of the two-tiered  governance  system  in the United  States:  On the
one hand, the division of sovereign  authority into state  and federal governments  is meant
to  advance  liberty  and democracy  by spreading  power and maintaining multiple  forums
for popular participation;  on  the other hand, the  supremacy  accorded  to  federal  law  is
intended to produce coherence and uniformity on  subjects of sufficient importance  or in
sufficient need.
Again, the issues  surrounding  school vouchers provides  a current disputed  context
for working  out the  choice  between  federal  uniformity  and  respect for  state  and  local
Id. (citations omitted).
45.  See  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U.S.  712  (2004);  Frank  S.  Ravitch,  Locke  v.  Davey  and the Lose-Lose
Scenario. What Locke Could Have Said, but Didn 't, 40 Tulsa  L. Rev.  255 (2004).
46.  See Gerald  E. Dempsey & Janet N. Petsche, Library Law: Does the First  Amendment Allow Libraries  to
Limit the Public Use of Their Property? http://www.mls.lib.il.us/ennounce/librarylaw/librarylaw  1I 06.pdf
(Oct. 26,  2006).  To  be  fair, doubt  may already  be  present on  the  viewpoint  discrimination  front.  Compare
Faith C. Church  Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 462 F.3d  1194  (9th Cir. 2006) (approving library's decision
to deny use of its meeting room for worship services)  with DeBoer v.  Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d  558, 574
(7th Cir. 2001)  (rejecting  city policy excluding as viewpoint discrimination and characterizing prayer session as
civic  event).  Whether  government  can  treat religion  differently  from other  activities  gives  rise  to  questions
about levels of Equal Protection scrutiny and sufficient governmental  interests.  In Locke, the Court rejected the
student's request  for strict  scrutiny of the  exclusion of religious training  from the  state  scholarship  program.
540  U.S.  712.  Absent  such  a  decision,  government  actors  will  be  hard-pressed  to  comply  with  the
Establishment Clause.
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control.  That choice  is on a collision course in  some jurisdictions:  Federal constitutional
interpretation  increasingly  frowns  on  the  exclusion  of religious  schools  from  public
funding  available  to other  secular private  schools,  while  some  states  forbid any public
aid to religious schools.  Some  state and local  governments do not merely  choose  not to
fund  religious  instruction;  their  state  constitutions  prohibit  public  aid  to  religious
schools, and in some cases, to any religious  institution.47  Many of these state provisions
in part or in whole  followed the failed effort of Congressman James Blaine  to amend  the
federal Constitution.48  Because James Blaine and many of his supporters expressed anti-
Catholic  views  in  support of restricting aid  to  religious  institutions,  many  critics  argue
that  state  prohibitions  are  indelibly  marred  by  anti-Catholic  hostility.4 9   The  four
members  of the  Supreme  Court  ready  to  revise  the Establishment  Clause test  in  2000
were also ready to overturn a state constitution  Blaine Amendment. 5 0  The full Court has
not ruled on the issue-yet.
So  the  question  remains  open:  Must  federal  constitutional  views  of  religious
liberty,  equal  protection, and  freedom  of expression  trump state  constitutional  bans  on
47.  More than  two-thirds of the  states limit public  funding of religious  schools or similar kinds of support.
See Thomas Berg  et al., School Vouchers: Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes, http://pewforum.org/issues/
files/VoucherPackage.pdf  (Nov. 2002).
48.  For analyses  of these  "Blaine  Amendments,"  see  Richard  Fossey  &  Robert  LeBlanc,  Vouchers for
Sectarian Schools after Zelman:  Will the First Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in  the Massachusetts
Constitution? 193  Educ. L. Rptr. 343  (2005); Toby J.  Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va.
L.  Rev.  117,  123 n.  32 (2000) (identifying the influence  of the federal  proposal  on 29-33 state provisions).  See
also The  Becket  Fund  for  Relig.  Liberty,  Blaine Amendments:  States,  http://www.blaineamendments.org/
states/states.html  (2003)  (linking  to  provisions  in  thirty-seven  state  constitutions).  For  assessments  of the
provisions-which  include  potential  thirty-seven  state  constitutions---compare  Kyle  Duncan,  Secularism's
Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72  Fordham  L.  Rev.  493  (2003)  (describing  and
criticizing  37  state  provisions)  with  Steven  K.  Green,  "Blaming Blaine":  Understanding the  Blaine
Amendment and the  "No-Funding" Principle,  2  First Amend.  L.  Rev.  107  (2003)  (defending  the provisions).
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty has organized  a series of legal challenges to state restrictions on funding
religious  institutions.  See e.g. The  Becket  Fund  for  Relig.  Liberty,  Becket Fund Challenges South Dakota
Blaine Amendment,  http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/90.html  (Apr. 24,  2003)  (describing Pucket v.
Hot Springs Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 120233  (Jan.  17,  2006)).
49  See e g. Joseph  P. Viteretti,  Choosing Equality: School Choice, The Constitution, and Civil Society  18,
152 (Brookings  Instn.  Press  1999);  Frederick  Mark  Gedicks,  Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments,  2 First
Amend.  L.  Rev.  85,  96  (2003).  See generally Philip  Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 193-251
(Harvard  U.  Press  2002);  Ira C.  Lupu &  Robert W.  Tuttle, Zelman 's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and  the Next Round of Constitutional  Battles, 78 Notre  Dame L. Rev. 917  (2003).
50.  The plurality opinion directly rejected state Blaine amendments  in these terms:
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively  sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to
disavow.  Although the dissent professes concern for "the implied exclusion of the less favored," the
exclusion of pervasively  sectarian schools  from government-aid  programs  is just  that,  particularly
given  the history  of such exclusion.  Opposition to aid  to "sectarian"  schools acquired  prominence
in the  1870's with  Congress's  consideration (and  near passage)  of the Blaine  Amendment,  which
would have amended the Constitution  to bar any aid to sectarian  institutions.  Consideration of the
amendment arose  at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general,
and it was  an open secret that "sectarian"  was code for "Catholic."  Notwithstanding  its history,  of
course,  "sectarian"  could,  on  its  face,  describe  the  school  of  any  religious  sect,  but  the  Court
eliminated  this  possibility  of confusion  when  it  coined  the  term  "pervasively  sectarian"-a  term
which,  at  that time,  could  be applied  almost  exclusively  to Catholic  parochial  schools  and which
even today's dissent exemplifies  chiefly by reference  to such schools.
In short, nothing  in the Establishment Clause requires  the exclusion of pervasively  sectarian schools
from  otherwise  permissible  aid  programs,  and  other  doctrines  of this  Court  bar it.  This  doctrine,
bon  of bigotry, should be buried now.
Mitchell, 530 U.S.  at 828-29 (citations omitted).
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aid  to  religious  schools,  where  the  state  or  locality  offers  support  to  secular  schools?
Should  this  be a moment  of national  supremacy,  elevating  the  emerging  constitutional
commitments  to  equal  protection  and  against  viewpoint  discrimination  over  state
concerns  about  advancing  religion  with  public  aid?  Or  should  state  constitutional
provisions restricting public  aid to religious institutions trigger the federal Constitution's
limits  on  federal  government  interference  with  the  states?  This  doctrinal  puzzle  has
given rise to much  scholarly debate and ongoing litigation.
5 1
The  usual  conclusion  would be  federal  supremacy  in  the  face of direct  conflicts
with state  law.52  The  federal and state norms are  on a collision course  but the collision
has not  yet happened;  the federal  courts have  not connected  the dots between decisions
permitting  parents  to  use  public  vouchers  to  select  religious  schools 53  and forbidding
exclusion  of  religious  groups  from  public  funding  otherwise  generally  available.54
Courts presented with  the problem have  ducked  it thus  far because  the  specific  federal
norm governing funding for religious schools remains  unclear; courts may also approach
the religion  and equality issues cautiously to avoid a show down between  the federal and
state  governments.  Ironically,  during  the  nineteenth  century,  the  federal  government
actually  made  bans  on  public  aid  to  religious  institutions  a  condition  of statehood  in
some  instances. 55   Currently,  states  may  experiment  with  voucher  plans  that  include
religious  schools; the  Cleveland plan had enough features and conditions to pass muster,
but other plans may not.56  So federal  law has not been construed  definitively to require
inclusion of religious schools  in public  funding schemes.  Given the "play in the joints"
between Establishment  and Free Exercise  demands,  federal constitutional commitments
could  permit  a  state  to  accord  vouchers  or  scholarships  to  religious  schools,  but  not
compel it to do so.57
But problems  would persist even  if a  Supreme  Court  majority  fully  announces  a
federal  norm that religious  schools must be included  in any public  funding  available  to
secular schools.  The chief difficulty  even  in  the face  of a  squarely presented  conflict
between  federal  and  state  norms  is  discerning  which  norm  is  more  protective  of
individual rights.  The axiom  that federal  constitutional  supremacy  should overtake  any
conflicting state rules  is nowhere more welcome and acclaimed than in overcoming state
discrimination against minority  groups.  Yet the bans on public aid to religious  schools
do  not  necessarily  reflect  discrimination  against  a  minority  group.  Many  state
51.  See e.g. Pew  Forum, Separation of Church and States: An Examination of State Constitutional  Limits
on  Government Funding  for Religious Institutions, http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=45  (Mar.
28, 2003).
52.  Romer v.  Evans, 517  U.S.  620,  633  (1996).  The  state  courts,  though, can  be  a  guardian  of federal
constitutional  protection  when challenged  by  state  constitutions.  See Reitman v. Mulkey,  387  U.S.  369,  373
(1967)  (affirming  Supreme  Court of California judgment  ruling that State  constitutional  amendment initiative
erasing  statutory  protection  against  racial  discrimination  in  housing  denied  equal  protection  of laws  under
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
53.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
54.  Good News Club, 533  U.S. 98; Mitchell, 530 U.S.  at 829; Rosenberger,  515 U.S.  at 841.
55.  See  Mark  Edward  DeForrest,  An  Overview and Evaluation of State  Blaine Amendments:  Origins,
Scope, and  First  Amendment Concerns, 26  Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 551,  573  (2003).
56  Zelman, 536  U.S. 639.
57.  Compare  Locke, 540 U.S.  712 with Zelman, 536 U.S.  639.  See also Steven K. Greene,  Locke v. Davey
and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 Temp.  L. Rev. 913  (2004).
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restrictions pre-dated the Blaine initiative; others drew diverse support as ways to protect
the  conscience  of minority  religious  groups,  including  Catholics.  States  can  mount
compelling  interests  in refraining  from support  to religious schools  quite  apart from any
historically  anti-Catholic  views.58  So the elements of bad motive at most would tarnish
only  some  of  the  state  restrictions  and  even  these  could  well  have  independent
compelling justifications-such  as avoiding religious strife-that would save them  from
this objection.
Moreover,  it is not clear whether the  ban on support for religious schools is less or
more  protective  of  liberty  than  compelled  inclusion  of  such  schools  in  public  aid
programs. 59  The truism that states can be more but  not less protective of constitutional
rights  than  the  federal  government  does  not  obviously  point  in  one  direction  here.
Consider which stance is more protective of federal constitutional rights:
1)  Strict separation of religion  and government,  and strict scrutiny
for free exercise; or
2)  Government  neutrality  toward  religious  and  secular  activities,
requiring  no  separation,  and requiring  no  accommodation  from
generally applicable laws?
60
The  first  view-which  until  recently  was  the  federal  constitutional  framework  and
remains the standard  in many states-finds harms to individual  liberty when government
mixes with religion  or fails to  accommodate  religious  practice as harms to liberty-and
hence strictly prohibits public aid to religious  institutions  while energetically  advancing
individual  free  exercise  through  exemptions  from  burdening  laws. 61  This  view  urges
58.  See Green, supra n. 48,  at 113-28,  135-43; Marc  D. Stem, Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism, and
Catholic Dogma, 2  First Amend. L.  Rev.  153,  166-203  (2003).  In Divided  by God, Noah Feldman argues  that
conflicts among adherents of different religions-not simple hostility toward Catholicism-produced state bans
on  funding  religion in  schools,  and  advocates  maintaining  such  bans  while  allowing  more  room  for public
displays of religious symbols.  Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America's Church-State  Problem-And What
We  Should Do about It (Farrar,  Straus  &  Giroux  2004).  Alan  Wolfe  treats  this  view  as  audacious  and
historically  plausible,  but  politically  and  normatively  problematic,  because  even  this  compromise  treats
different  religions  differently:  Those  making  symbols  important  benefit,  while  the ban  on public  aid  hurts
religious that rely on institutions,  like schools and hospitals,  more than  others  that do  not.  Alan Wolfe,  The
State of  the Church-State  Debate, http://www.slate.com/id/2123459/  (Aug.  1, 2005).
59.  A  recent  work,  for  example,  argues  that religious  liberty  calls  for  public aid  to  any  school  that  the
government  accepts  for purposes of the compulsory  school laws-but also  calls  for government  regulation to
ensure  students learn  how to rationally  reflect on their religious training.  See generally Ian MacMullen, Faith
in Schools? Autonomy, Citizenship, and Religious Education in the Liberal State (Princeton  U.  Press  2007).
This prescription  would enhance the  liberty of parents who want to select religious  schools and the liberty of
students  to become equipped  to choose their religious  beliefs,  but would undermine  the  liberty of those who
want to  give  no aid  to religious  instruction  and  those  who  want  to  protect  religious  instruction  from state
regulation and rational skepticism.
60.  These two positions do not exhaust  the possibilities.  See Kathleen  Sullivan,  The New Religion and the
Constitution, 116  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1397  (2003);  see  also the  discussion  of Sullivan's  taxonomy  in  the  text
accompanying  infra n. 67.
61.  The  federal  version of this  position  prevailed  when the  Court  embraced the  standards  of Lemon, 403
U.S.  602,  and Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.  This view-strong  separation and strong  accommodation-persists  in
states.  Through  state  constitutional  provisions  or statues,  thirty-seven  states  forbid  public  aid  to  religious
schools;  some  go  further  and  forbid  aid  to religious  institutions.  See Berg, supra n.  47  (summarizing  state
provisions);  see e.g  Fla. Const.,  art.  1, § 3 ("No  revenue of the  state  or any  political  subdivision or  agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly  in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination  or in aid of any sectarian  institution."); Mass. Const., art. XVIII, § 2.
[N]o  grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made
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separation between religion  and government  in order to protect both; it seeks  to protect
religious  adherents  from government  pressures and government from religious pressure.
It also  is meant  to protect  the liberty of individuals  who  do  not  affiliate  with religious
groups  seeking  the  funds  or  with  any  religious  group,  and  to  protect  everyone  from
potentially  divisive  and  irreconcilable  struggles  over  public  resources.  In  light  of
historical  lessons  from religious  conflict,  renewed  by current  events around  the world,
and  religious  mobilization  permeating  U.S.  politics,62  the  wisdom  of  a constitutional
commitment  to  separate  public  resources  from  religiously-inspired  politics  seems
enduring.
Yet, a second  view treats exclusion  of religion from public benefits  as  the greater
harm  to  liberty,  and  hence  embraces  neutrality  as  the  watchword  to  measure  both
acceptable  government  involvement  in religion  and refusals  to exempt individuals  from
general  laws  that may  burden  their  religious  exercise.  Analogizing  religions  to  racial
minorities,  advocates of this view  emphasize  historical  discrimination  against Catholics
or other sects and warn against inadvertent  as well  as deliberate exclusions.  Excluding a
specific religion or religion in general echoes  past disapproval.
The two  views  remain  alive  in debates  among advocates, judges,  and justices.63
To  further complicate  matters,  scholars  suggest  that the  ban on  public  aid to  religious
schools reflects a theological  rather than a neutral position.64  Judges  and advocates  can
be  excused  for  feeling  dizzy  if asked  to  discern  the  floor  of  federally-guaranteed
freedom.  Now,  it  becomes  a  challenging  methodological  and  substantive  question:
should the remnant of the  separatist view be  the guide  or instead  should the neutrality
test govern?  Is the required  minimum federal permission  to include  religious  schools in
public  aid or federal  mandate to  include  religious  schools in public  aid?  Which should
be the "floor" of required liberty?
If  minimally  mandated  religious  freedom  and  government  impartiality  means
or authorized  by the  commonwealth  or any political  division thereof for the  purpose of founding,
maintaining  or aiding  any  other school  or institution  of leaming,  whether under  public  control  or
otherwise,  wherein  any  denominational doctrine  is inculcated,  or any other school,  or any  college,
infirmary,  hospital,  institution,  or  educational,  charitable  or religious  undertaking  which  is  not
publicly  owned  and  under  the exclusive  control,  order and  superintendence  of public officers  or
public agents.
Id.  After the  Supreme Court struck down  the  Religious Freedom Restoration Act-Congressional  effort to  re-
establishing  the  strict-scrutiny test  for potential burdens  from general  legislation  on  religious free  exercise-
twelve  states  formally  passed state  laws  to ensure  in state  matters  the  application of the "compelling  interest
test"  in religious freedom  cases (AL,  AZ, CT, FL, ID, IL, NM,  OK, PA,  RI,  SC, and TX).  Seven more states
judicially established a "compelling  interest test" for application  of state law (KS, MA, MN,  OH, VT, WA, WI,
and  MI).  See  Christopher  J.  Klicka,  State  Religious  Freedom Acts,  http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/
000000/00000083.asp  (Jan. 28,  2003).  For efforts to work through some  related  issues,  see Thomas C.  Berg,
State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and  Public Education, 32 U.C.  Davis L. Rev.  531  (1999);  W. Cole
Durham,  Jr.,  State RRFAs  and the  Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32  U.C.  Davis  L.  Rev.  665  (1999);
Eugene  Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A  Research Agenda with  Test  Suites, 21
Cardozo  L.  Rev. 595 (1999).
62.  The  familiar  divisions over abortion  and same-sex  marriage  are  now joined by  religious mobilization
around  global warming and poverty.
63.  See Knippenberg, supra n. 40  (discussing shifts in treatment of religion without a new dominant view).
64.  See  Richard W.  Garnett,  The Theology of the Blaine Amendments,  2  First Amend.  L.  Rev. 45  (2003).
Similarly complicating  is the  religious dimension of the early movements  for public schooling in Amenca.  See
e.g. Charles Glenn,  The Myth of the Common School (Institute Contemporary Stud. 2002).
[Vol.  42:911
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss4/9THREE RIDDLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
keeping public  support away from religious schools, then  states should be able to choose
whether  to include  religious  schools  in  public  support programs.  Future  decisions  may
require  inclusion of religious organizations  in federal  aid programs, but that still  would
not  answer what  the  states  must  do.
6 5  Greater  freedom  does  not necessarily  come  by
mandating  inclusion  of religious  programs  in  state  and  local  public  aid.  Indeed,  the
benefits  of variety  and  flexibility  afforded by  a federalist  system  may  look  especially
welcome  for  navigating  these  difficult  issues.  The  federalist  structure  has  long  been
celebrated  for  permitting  the  states  to  serve  as laboratories  of social  experimentation,
encouraging  local  political  engagement,  checking  concentrated  power,  and  according
latitude  for the  states  to strike their own  solutions to hard problems. 66  That, of course,
would require  accepting  varied  answers  across  the  country and contrasts  between  what
federal  and  state laws  prescribe,  exposing  the  tension  between  federal  supremacy  and
state  autonomy.  But  that  flexibility  may  be  helpful  as  each  level  of government,  in
different regions of the country,  with different  constellations  of religious groups, tries to
comply with the federal constitutional requirements  to refrain from either endorsing  any
religions or disapproving them.
Reflecting on what the three puzzles share, I will also turn to policy considerations,
different  ways  to  combine  the  puzzles,  and  the  virtues  of  incremental  constitutional
decision-making.
V.  A COMMON DIFFICULTY:  THE PROBLEMS  OF ALL OR NOTHING
Each of these puzzles presents  distinct difficulties; each comes into play now when
states  and  local  schemes  give  aid to  public  and private  schools  but  exclude  religious
ones.  As  a  further  commonality,  each  of the  puzzles  presents  a dilemma,  with  each
prong of the  dilemma both  compelling  and unsatisfactory precisely because  its selection
requires  rejecting  its alternate.  Thus, the puzzling conjunction  of the Free  Exercise  and
Establishment  doctrines  could lead  government  actors  to  accommodate  free  exercise  at
the cost of government partiality toward religion or else to secure scrupulous government
distance  from religion  at the cost of disfavoring and burdening  religious exercise.  The
second puzzle  invites judges to respect the recent precedent, overturning  prior precedent,
but  then the values of stability and predictability usually tied to precedent  would justify
destabilizing  much  of  the  surrounding  legal  terrain;  adhering  to  precedent  in  the
surrounding  areas,  in  contrast,  could  require  confining  the  new precedent  to  a  narrow
foot-print,  which  then  would  cast  into  doubt  the  fidelity  that  stare  decisis  demands.
Federalism's  Janus-faced  tribute  to  state  autonomy  could  lead  courts  to  limit  federal
uniformity  and supremacy;  full  embrace  of federal power would nullify state autonomy
and the  decentralized  variety  that  it enables.  The  courts  must  choose  between  federal
and state  control  in  cases of direct  collisions, but over time  across  different  issues, the
65.  See Stern,  supra  n. 58,  at  157.
66.  See e.g. A.E.  Dick Howard, Federalism,  in The Bill of Rights, the Courts, and the Law 335 (3d ed.,  U.
Va. Press  1999);  A.E. Dick Howard,  The Uses of  Federalism: The American Experience, 8 Am. U.  J. Intl.  L. &
Policy  389  (1993).  For  a  critical  view  of the  scientific  metaphors  informing  some  defenses  of American
federalism, see  G. Alan  Tarr, Laboratories  of  Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism,  and Scientific Management,
31  J.  Federalism 37 (2001).
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federal  courts can build a portfolio of state control and federal control decisions.
Working  through  the  relationship  between  the  Establishment  and  Free  Exercise
commitments  of the First  Amendment,  it  is possible  to  find  more  alternatives  than  a
strong view  of one and a weak view  of the other.  A particular situation may call  for a
solution  responsive  to  the  tugs  from  each  direction.  Kathleen  Sullivan  devised  this
taxonomy  showing four  possible views,  each  a permutation  of the potentially  strong  or
weak view of each of the constitutional clauses:
67
1)  Ambitious judicial enforcement  of both  clauses:  Strong judicial
enforcement  of the  Establishment  Clause  and  strong judicial
enforcement of the Free Exercise  clause,68 treating religion like
a  private  expressive  association  deserving  ample  government
protection subject to the caveat that the government itself cannot
speak in a religious voice;
2)  Restrained  judicial  review  for  both  clauses:  Weak  judicial
enforcement  of the  Establishment  Clause  and  weak  judicial
enforcement  of the Free  Exercise  Clause,69  treating  religion as
an  ordinary  interest  group,  allowed  to  participate  freely  in
politics,  gain  advantage  from  political  deals  and  spoils,  but
secure no  special advantage from judicial solicitude;
3)  Strong  separation  of religion  and  government:  Strong  judicial
enforcement  of  the  Establishment  Clause  and  weak  judicial
enforcement  of the Free  Exercise  Clause, and viewing  religion
as  a  quasi-government,  with  potential  authority  over  its
members,  but  not  deserving  subsidy  from  the  government  or
protection from the rival secular government;  and
4)  Strong  accomodation  of religion:  Weak judicial  enforcement  of
the  Establishment  Clause  and  strong  enforcement  of the  Free
Exercise  Clause,  according  religion  a status  like  a discrete  and
insular  minority  in  need  of  special  judicial  protection  and
accommodation  even  to  the point  of government  involvement
with religion.
Two of these views-i  and 3-would roll back the clock and rule  against public aid to
schools  even  in the  indirect  form  of vouchers  if that means  people  are  forced  against
their consciences  to pay taxes  that  support religious  instruction.7 0  The  two remaining
positions-2  and  4-would  be  compatible  with  a  government  voucher  program,
permitting  parents  to  select religious  schools,  but only  one of them,  4,  would demand
courts to order inclusion of religious schools  in a legislative  or school board plan leaving
them out.  All three other views would treat that solution  as excessive and undue judicial
solicitude for religion on either Establishment  or Free Exercise grounds.
7 1
67.  Sullivan, supra n. 60.
68.  This is comparable  to option 1. Id. and accompanying  text.
69.  This is comparable  to option 2.  Id.
70.  See Feldman, supra n. 58.
71.  Working  out  precisely  what  doctrinal  tests  advance  "weak"  or  "strong  enforcement  of each  clause
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VI.  THE  POLICY DIMENSIONS:  PART OF CONSTITUTIONAL  ANALYSIS?
What none of these approaches  detects, however,  is a policy consideration  that has
constitutional  ramifications:  The  potentially  deleterious  effect  on  a  diverse  and
democratic  society  if, over  time,  the  percentage  of children  attending  private  schools
increased  from  the  usual  ten  percent 72  to  approach  a majority of the population.  That
kind  of  shift  would  undermine  the  role  of  public  schools  as  symbols  of  equality,
opportunity, unity, and democracy. 73  The vast majority of private schools  in the United
States pursue  specific  religious missions,  and by  definition,  they are  not open to all  nor
are  they  guided  by  the  mission of public  schools.  A  major  exodus of students  from
public to private  schools would  terminate the  role of public  schools  in  forging a shared
American  experience  and  identity.  The  character  of the nation  itself is  at  stake  if a
majority of students  pursues that  option.  Recent experience  in Great  Britain  indicates
difficulties  ensuring  that  publicly-funded  religious  schools  contribute  to  national
cohesion. 74  The potential risk  from increasing private  school  student enrollments  does
not present  an  all-or-nothing  choice.  Private  schooling  does  and  must persist  as  an
option  in  a nation  that  cherishes  religious  and parental  freedom,  and the U.S.  Supreme
Court long ago recognized a parental right to select private schools as a means to comply
with  a compulsory  school  law.75  A  green light  to public  funding of vouchers and  tax
credits  redeemable  at parochial  schools  raises, however,  the  subtle  issue of a potential
remains another task.  For efforts  to work out consistent tests, see Feldman, supra n.  58; Abner S. Greene,  The
Apparent Consistency of  Religion Clause Doctrine,  21  Wash.  U.  J.L. & Policy 225 (2006).
72.  U.S.  Dept.  of Educ.,  The  Condition of Education 2007  25,  http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf
(2007) (private school enrollments  have hovered  around ten percent).  The lion share of these enrollments  is in
religious schools.  Over the past  fifteen years,  the distribution of students  in private  schools has  shifted  some,
with fewer in Catholic schools and growth in conservative  Christian schools.
Although  Roman  Catholic  schools  continue  to  have  the  largest  share  of  total  private  school
enrollment,  the percentage  decreased from 55 to 46 percent  because of the decline in  the percentage
of students enrolled  in parochial schools  (i.e.,  run by a parish,  not by  a diocese  or independently).
On  the other hand, the  percentage of students  enrolled in Conservative Christian  schools  increased
from  11  to  15  percent.  In  addition, there  was an  increase in the percentage  of students  enrolled in
nonsectarian  private  schools,  from  13  to  18  percent.  This  change  in  distribution  from  Roman
Catholic  to  other religious  and  nonsectarian  private  schools occurred  at  both  the elementary  and
secondary levels.
Id.
73.  Adam  Cohen,  A  First Report  Card on  Vouchers,  http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/
04/19/vouchers.html  (Apr. 19,  1999).
Public  schools have long held  the promise  of being  America's great  equalizer,  mixing students of
different  races,  classes and  religions  in a  single  student body.  At  their best, public  schools have
united diverse groups of students, many of them immigrants, by passing on the nation's shared civic
heritage, from George Washington to George Washington  Carver.  Public schools have the ability to
teach democracy  simply by being open to all children, and  regarding them--and their backgrounds
and religions-as  equally worthy.  "Nobody  claims  private  schools  can't teach  tolerance,  mutual
respect and  nondiscrimination,"  says  Princeton political science  professor Amy Gutmann.  "But  in
public schools, they are taught as much by the mixing  of students as they are by the curriculum."
Id.
74.  The  Muslim  News,  Benefits  of  Religious  Education  Not  Realized-UK  Schools  Watchdog,
http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=12900  (June  17,  2007)  (reporting study  by  Office  for
Standards  in  Education,  Children's  Services  and  Skills  about  the  effects  of religious  education  in  Great
Britain).
75.  See Pierce, 269 U.S.  510.
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tipping  point.76  More  individual  families  are  likely  to opt  for private  schools-and  as
specific towns, cities,  and states encourage  such options through  voucher programs  and
other aid.  The  cumulative  impact  of individual  family  decisions  could  well alter  the
character of schooling and socialization  in America.
Patterns  of  socioeconomic  and  racial  segregation  in  public  schooling  already
expose  the  distance  between  the  ideal of the common  school  and the  realities  of U.S.
public  schools  as  a  vehicle  for  building  a  shared  American  experience  and  equal
opportunities  for all  students.7 7  Some  advocates  of school  vouchers  claim that private
schools can better advance the critical thinking and social  cohesion  crucial to democracy
than public schooling now does.78  But this speculation is unsupported  by evidence about
the range of religious schools emerging  in this country, and it is challenged by increased
racial  and class segregation  in privatized  schooling in other countries.  Moreover, unless
tightly  regulated  in  content  and  admissions  practices,  private  schools  could  neglect
critical  thinking  and  tolerance  altogether.  Education  expert  Richard  Kahlenberg
comments:
If we want  students  who think critically,  do we  really  want parents to use public  fuids to
educate  their  children  at  institutions  handpicked  to  replicate  the  parents'  private  beliefs
(about, say, creationism) rather than to expose students to broader possibilities?  If we want
to teach children what it means to be an  American,  do we  want public  funds to subsidize
private  schools  set  up  especially  to  appeal,  say,  to  an Armenian  population,  or to  those
seeking  an Afrocentric  curriculum?  What  about schools  that harden  religious  differences
rather than emphasizing  commonality?
79
School  choice-whether  through  magnet  and  charter  schools  within  the  public
system  or encompassing  private schools  through  voucher programs-can  offer avenues
for  voluntary  racial  and  socio-economic  integration,  for  experimentation,  and  for
competition, but it can also cream away from ordinary public schools the most motivated
families and crucial  public  and private  resources.  The politicized  debate at the national
level  and  complex  goals  behind  the  reforms  make  fair  evaluation  of existing  efforts
difficult.80  Yet risks of social division,  inconsistent  standards, and diminished  attention
76.  See  Malcolm  Gladwell,  The  Tipping Point: How Little  Things Can Make a Big Difference (Little,
Brown &  Co. 2000)  (examining  "social  epidemics,"  or sudden  and  often chaotic changes  from  one  state  to
another).
77.  Gary Orfield  & Chungmei  Lee,  Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare? http://www.eric.
ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage  01/0000019b/80/1  b/b8/82.pdf (Jan. 2004).
78.  See generally Making Good Citizens: Education and  Civil Society (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteretti
eds.,  Yale U.  Press 2003).
79.  Richard  D.  Kahlenberg,  Review:  Good Schools,  Good Citizens, Am.  Prospect  37  (Mar.  25,  2002)
(available  at http://www.equaleducation.org/commentary.asp?opedid=904).
80  See V. Dion  Haynes, Congress Lifts Income Limit for Students in Evaluation, Wash. Post B04 (Dec.  12,
2006)  (alteration  in income-eligibility  for  participants  in federal  school  voucher plan  in District of Columbia
produces political disagreements  and questions about evaluation); Lois Romano,  GOP Unveils School Voucher
Plan, Wash.  Post  A17  (July  19,  2006)  (noting  party  divisions  over  the  plan);  Cecilia  Elena  Rouse, Private
School  Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Q.J.
Econ.  553 (May 1998)  (finding positive  effects on math but not reading  scores for participants);  Ctr. for Policy
Alt.,  School  Vouchers, http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/issue/SchoolVouchers.xml  (accessed  Sept.
13,  2007);  Alan  Krueger  &  Pei  Zhu,  Another  Look  at  the  New  York  City  Voucher  Experiment,
http://ers.princeton.edu/workingpapers/lers.pdf  (Apr.  2003)  (rejecting  interpretation  of study claiming  large
improvement  for voucher  participants);  Dan  Lips  & Evan  Feinberg,  School Choice: 2006 Progress Report,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/bgl970.cftm  (Sept.  18,  2006).
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to critical  thinking could  result if religious  schools come to educate  30%,  50%, or more
children  across this  diverse nation.  Hence,  decisions to  exclude religious  schools from
public  school  choice  schemes  can  reflect judgments  about  educational  concerns  quite
apart from concerns about religious preference  or entanglement.
If impact  risk of social  harm  from a  shift  toward  high  levels  of religious  school
enrollments  is foreseeable,  what role should  it play in constitutional  analysis?  Whether
characterized  as  the  ethical  strand  of  constitutional  analysis, 81  or  folded  into
considerations directed by the doctrine, 82 consideration of the effects of a challenged  law
or a proposed  ruling  can  be an  element of constitutional  interpretation.  Effects  matter
not simply because  constitutions ultimately are  meant to serve  societal purposes;  effects
matter quite specifically  in assuring the balance between Establishment  Clause and Free
Exercise  commitments  embodied  in  the  Bill  of  Rights,  in  protecting  the  complex
relationship  between  state  and  federal  governments,  and  in  maintaining  respect  for
precedent  consistent with  changing  needs.  Each  of the  puzzles  associated  with  these
doctrines  requires  adjustments  over  time  rather  than  once-and-for-all  solutions;  each
requires awareness of the effects of the Court's own actions.
The current Supreme  Court does  not, however,  seem headed toward this approach
to constitutional method.  Instead, prominent members of the Court have revived original
intent,  literal  textualism,  and  formalist  doctrines,  and  the Court has  been  turning  away
from consideration of the effects of a policy in assessing potential Establishment Clause
problems, without, however,  devising a new dominant view.83  Nothing  in the  language
81.  Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional  Interpretation 12-22 (Basil Blackwell,  Inc.  1991).
82.  The  Lemon  test  traditionally  included  consideration  of the  effects  of  the  challenged  law  on  the
advancement  or suppression of religion.  Lemon, 403  U.S.  602.  Effects  are not  directly examined  under  the
emerging  doctrinal  inquiries  that  instead  test whether  the  challenged  law  is  neutral  or whether  a  reasonable
observer  would  think  that  the  law  endorses religion.  Yet  even  under  these  inquiries,  effects  can  become
relevant-in  assessing  the baseline against  which to check the  law for neutrality  and  in assessing the  effects a
reasonable  observer  would  perceive  to  be  associated  with  the  law--especially  if  Justice  O'Connor's
contributions  to  the  emerging  theory  retain  any  force.  See  Rosenberger, 514  U.S.  819,  846  (O'Connor,  J.,
concurring).  See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2  First Amend.  L. Rev.
85  (2003)  (available  at  http://ssm.com/abstract-419221)  (arguing  that  neutrality  prevents  government  from
conditioning  the  receipt  of social  welfare  benefits  on religious  affiliation  (or  lack  thereof),  but  should  not
generally prevent government from imposing secular conditions  as terms of the benefits).
83.  See Knippenberg, supra n 40.  In Rosenberger,  several justices clashed over their readings of the origin
of the amendments  and their precursors  in James Madison's Memorial  and Remonstrance  against a Virginia tax
levy for support of the established church and Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious  Liberty.  515 U.S.
819.  Justice Thomas read that history "simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious
faiths  over others."  Id. at  854 (Thomas,  J.,  concurring)  (citations omitted).  Justice Souter, in contrast, noted
that the bill  subject  to James Madison's  critique  itself would have funded religious  and nonreligious schools,
and  hence  the  objection  at  the  time  was  directed  to  any  governmental  support  of religion,  even  if offered
equally  to  other  sects  and  secular  establishments  Id  at  863  (Souter,  Stevens,  Ginsburg  &  Breyer,  JJ.,
dissenting);  see  also Lee  v.  Weisman,  505  U.S.  577  (1992);  Douglas  Laycock,  "Nonpreferential" Aid  to
Religion: A False Claim About Original  Intent, 27 Win. & Mary L.  Rev.  875 (1986).
Professor  Tribe  has  cast  doubt  on  the  utility  of  looking  to  the  intention  of particular  framers  in
discerning enduring meaning of the religion clauses; he has emphasized the  importance of keeping in mind the
differences  between  Jefferson's  commitment  to  protect  politics  from  religion  and  Madison's  goal  to protect
both spheres from one another.  Laurence  H.  Tribe, American Constitutional  Law  1158-60 (2d ed., Foundation
Press  1988).  His  cautions  about  originalism  in  this  context  are  especially  well  placed,  since  most  of  the
contemporary  debate  would not  even have occurred  without  the Court's  decision  in  1947  to  apply  the  First
Amendment  to  the  states,  through  the  then-innovative  theory  of  incorporation  through  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.  Everson, 330 U.S.  1.  Application of the First  Amendment too looks quite  different now, given
that  several  states  had an  official  established  church  when  the  First  Amendment  was adopted.  See  Kathleen
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of the  religion  clauses  offers  relevant  or  specific  guidance  about  whether  to  consider
social  effects.  It is striking, however,  that past doctrinal  interpretation  of Free Exercise
and  Anti-Establishment  commitments  has  sustained  precisely  the  pattern  of  ninety
percent public  and  ten percent  private  school  enrollments  that characterized  American
kindergarten through twelfth-grade  education for decades.
VII.  PUTTING THE PUZZLES  TOGETHER
Keeping in mind the question about whether and how likely effects of government
subsidies  for religious  schooling, putting the distinct puzzles together  might be  helpful.
Let us try by combining two at a time:
A.  Religion Clauses + Federalism
Courts  could  construe  the  Constitution's  religion  clauses  to  leave  room  for
localities  and  states  to  decide  whether  to  subsidize  religious  schools  in  a  larger  aid
program.  Such  a  conclusion--drawing  together  the  religion  clauses  puzzle  and  the
federalism  puzzle-would  acknowledge  that  there  are  multiple  ways  to  realize  the
simultaneous  commitments  to  ensure  private  religious  freedom  and  protect  both
government  and  religion  from  one  another.84   Precisely  because  different  people
interpret the  relations  between  the clauses  differently,  the  courts should  be wary  about
foreclosing  local  choice.  But  this  calls  for  reading  the  religion  clauses  with  either
sufficient  confidence  to include policy  concerns  in interpreting  the clauses  or sufficient
humility to make room for democratic and state-level decision-making.
85
B.  Stare Decisis + Federalism
Thinking  simultaneously about the puzzles of stare decisis and federalism can also
be  helpful  here.  Both  the  tradition  of  deference  to  precedent  in  constitutional
interpretation  and  the  Constitution's  structural  provisions  offer  crucial  caution  to  put
brakes  on  rapid  change.  Those  virtues  would be  welcome  when  courts  consider  state
constitutions  forbidding  public  aid  to  religious  schools-and  also  when  local
governments  themselves  consider  whether  to  follow  Cleveland's  sc.ool  vouchers
initiative  and expand public scholarships  to private  schools.86  Adherence  to precedent
when there  is  a recent  decision  reversing  one  line of cases  should,  in this  spirit, point
Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional  Law 1508  (15th  ed.,  Foundation Press 2004).
84.  Tribe, supra  n.  83,  at  1158-60.
85.  The  second  option  resembles  the  minimalism  advocated  by  Cass  Sunstein,  One  Case at a  Time:
Judicial Minimalism on  the Supreme Court (Harvard  U.  Press  1999).  He defends  judicial  decision-making
focused  on reaching low-level,  fact-drenched agreement  on  individual cases while leaving  "fundamental  issues
undecided."  Id. Yet the shifting treatment of aid to religious schools,  and the risk of a "tipping  point" quickly
shifting school enrollments  to private schools-may  demand a  very different judicial method,  one attentive  to
the  cumulative  impact of  individual  decisions.  The  large  substantive and  methodological  competences  for
pursuing such an approach may explain the paucity of support for this kind of constitutionalism  quite as well  as
the lack of textual grounding  in the constitution.
86.  Milwaukee,  alongside Cleveland,  initiated voucher programs  that include religious schools.  Evaluation
efforts  have  been  as  yet  inconclusive.  Natl.  Educ.  Assn.,  School  Vouchers: The Emerging Track Record,
http://www.nea.org/vouchers/02voutrack.html  (Apr.  2002);  U.S. Gen. Acctg.  Off.,  School Vouchers: Publicly
Funded  Programs  in Cleveland and Milwaukee, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-0  1-914 (Apr. 2002).
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broadly  to  the  entire  array  of precedents,  not  simply  the most  recent  reversal.  In  this
light, a voucher plan including religious  schools  is permitted-if parents  are the circuit-
breaker between public  funding and the state, if there  are many  secular choices, if there
is  a  demonstrated  history  of  public  school  failure  87-but the  Constitution  does  not
compel  inclusion of religious  schools in a voucher or other public aid program.
C.  Stare  Decisis + Religion Clauses
A  constitution  devoted  to  ordered  liberty  should  advance  personal  liberty
consistent with traditions of public  order.  In the context of potentially compelled public
aid to religious schools, courts could ask whether personal  liberty lies with allowing state
bans on aid to religion, because these restrictions prevent the state  from compelling  any
taxpayer to aid a religious  institution-or instead with  equalizing financial incentives  so
individuals  who want to choose religious schooling for their children receive  support just
as do those who elect  secular public  school?  Each  view offers a plausible claim  as the
floor of minimum liberty,88  so sheer invocation of individual liberty not does offer much
help here.
Stare  decisis in the particular context of personal  liberty, though,  may offer some
help  through  the  notion  of  individual  and  societal  reliance.  Adherence  to  older
precedents  matters  in  the  context  of protections  of personal  liberty  not  simply  as  an
expression  of familiar  societal  resistance  to  change,  but also  with  due  respect  for the
individual  and  social practices  that  grow  around  the  precedents,  and the  reliance  that
these  patterns reflect  and in  turn  propel.  This notion  of individual  and  social reliance
animates  the  Supreme  Court's  adherence  to  precedent  in  Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania  v. Casey89 and reversal of precedent in Lawrence v.  Texas.90
In  Casey, the joint opinion  for  a plurality of the  Supreme  Court justices reasoned  that
reliance  interests  undergird  judicial  respect  for precedent  where  personal  liberty  is  at
stake.9 1  That Casey opinion in turn informed the Court's majority in Lawrence when the
Court invalidated a Texas statute criminalizing intimate sex acts between members of the
same sex and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick. The Lawrence majority relied on Casey
both  for  the recognition  of personal  liberty under  the  due  process  clause  and  for the
caution  "when  a  court  is  asked  to  overrule  a  precedent  recognizing  a  constitutional
liberty  interest,  individual  or  societal reliance  on the  existence  of that liberty cautions
with particular strength against reversing course."
92
In Casey, the Court stressed the reliance by individual women  and society when it
resisted  arguments  for reversing  Roe v.  Wade's recognition of a women's  fundamental
liberty to control reproduction through access to abortion:
[F]or two  decades  of economic  and social  developments,  people  have  organized  intimate
relationships  and made  choices that  define  their views  of themselves  and  their places in
87.  Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; Agostini, 521  U.S.  203.
88.  Id.
89.  505  U.S. 833 (1992).
90.  539 U.S. 558 (2003).
91.  505 U.S.  833.
92.  539  U.S. 558, 577 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-56).
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society,  in reliance  on the  availability  of abortion  in  the  event  that  contraception  should
fail.  The ability of women  to  participate  equally  in the  economic  and  social  life of the
Nation  has been  facilitated  by  their  ability  to  control  their reproductive  lives ....  The
Constitution  serves  human  values,  and  while  the  effect  of reliance  on  Roe  cannot  be
exactly  measured,  neither  can  the  certain  cost  of overruling  Roe  for  people  who  have
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.
93
Implicit here  is reliance not only by women, but also  by employers  and families  on the
availability of women to the labor force enabled by control  over reproduction and child-
birth.  Also powerfully  present,  though  perhaps  less  discussed,  is the reliance  by  men,
who  could  count  on  the  availability  of  abortion  as  a  reason  for  engaging  in  sexual
intercourse  with  women  without  obligations  to  their  female  partners  even  when
contraception  fails.  Generationally-marked  shifts not only in sexual  relations but also in
dating,  marriage,  and  family  formation  emerged,  with  both  men  and women  ordering
their lives around the presumed availability of abortion.  These practices in turn affected
the direction  of advocacy efforts  and public policy.  As pro-choice advocates  for women
and families  invested in keeping  abortion safe  and legal,  neither public  policy nor  civil
society  developed  alternative  social  and  policy  structures  that  would  render  women's
workforce  participation  compatible  with  child-bearing,  despite  the  urging  of cultural
feminists who envisioned
alternative  structures--ones  that are  more hospitable  not only  to pregnant  women  but to
working parents.  On a practical  level, what that entails  is a cluster of legal regulations, tax
incentives..,  directed towards  a cluster of issues:  guaranteed  leaves, job security, flexible
working  schedules, part-time employment, and adequate child  care.  On a more theoretical
level,  that  agenda  implies  a  broader  commitment  to  traditional  female  values  of
collaboration,  co-operation,  and care  taking.  Given  the role constraints  that have  limited
male  as  well  as  female  experience,  both  sexes  have  a  stake  in  such  a  reconstructive
enterprise.
9 4
Some  pro-life/anti-abortion  advocates  have  supported  the  same  or  a  very  similar
vision.95  But as most people  relied  on the social  relationships  enabled  by Roe, neither
motivation nor action for such  alternatives emerged.  The Casey majority concluded that
reversing  Roe  would  not  alter  the  economic,  social,  and  sexual  mores  that  emerged
precisely  because  of legalized  abortion;  the Court concluded that  reversal  of precedent
there instead would simply leave women endangered and burdened.96
93.  505  U.S.  at  856  (citations  omitted).  The  Casey Court  tried  to  distinguish  two  key  reversals  of
longstanding  precedents  because  they reflected  changes  in facts  or  factual understandings.  See id  at  861-64
(discussing  how  West  Coast Hotel rejected  Lochner's view  that unfettered  economic  markets  meet  human
needs  and Brown v. Board of Education rejected  Plessy's view that legal  segregation  does not produce  racial
stigma  for the minority  group).  This  is a  curious use of "fact"  for in both  cases  the Court is  looking behind
ideological  claims  and putting  its own  weight behind particular  interpretations  of social  experience.  On this
basis, advocates  could claim  that the Court should  recognize  as  "fact"  that the  separationist  approach  to  the
Establishment Clause produced stigmatizing exclusions of religious institutions from public aid.
94.  Nancy Cott,  What is Feminism? 157 (Juliet Mitchell  & Ann Oakley eds., Pantheon Books  1986).
95.  See  Kerri-Ann  Kiniorski,  Work  vs.  Family,  5  Am.  Feminist  3  (1998)  (available  at
http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/1998/summer/Summer98.pdf).
96.  See Catherine  A. MacKimnnon,  The Male Ideology of Privacy:  A  Feminist Perspective on the Right to
Abortion, 17  Radical  Am. 23 (July-Aug.  1983)  (viewing abortion  from  a male point of view,  leaving women
unequal in reproductive  and sexual choices).
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Social  and economic practices  have analogously  grown  up around  the  absence  of
government  support  for  religious  schools  in  the United  States.  Religious  communities
have  devised  their  own  ways  to  support  these  schools-including  charitable  giving,
reinforced  by  the  federal  tax  code's  charitable  deduction  provision.  Those  religious
schools  that  welcome  people  outside  the  religion  also  recruit  scholarship  funds  from
broader sources.  Rather than view these practices as happenstance  and mere making-do,
constitutional  analysts  could  understand  this independence  and self-reliance  by families
and religious communities  as crucially  important to the vitality of religious  life and civil
society in America-especially  when compared with  the European  societies where both
government  financed religious  schools and fading religious communities  are the norm.97
State-run  religious  institutions  in Europe  lack  autonomy and have  been  associated  with
declining support among  the populace.  If all  religious schools  become dependent  upon
state  financial  support, both  their independence  and ability  to  maintain  private  support
would be jeopardized.
Even  more fundamentally,  religious  institutions and practices have  evolved  in the
United States  in distinctive  directions because  of the separation of religion  from public
schooling  as well as the efforts of religious  groups to include  non-adherents  in their own
schools.98   The  evolution  of Catholic  schools  as vital  urban institutions  serving  large
numbers of Protestant children of color-and  the  curricular commitments  to ecumenism
and  citizenship-reveal  the  reliance  of  Catholics  and  non-Catholics  alike  on  the
emergence  of religious  schools  as a distinct alternative  to  public schools.99  So perhaps
ironically, it is the non-reliance on government that has made religious schools vibrant in
America-and judicially-mandated  public  support  could  endanger this  tradition. 1 00   In
light of these  complex patterns of individual and social reliance,  the Lawrence majority
and Casey plurality would warn today's constitutional interpreters  against construing the
97.  See  Steven  Pfaff, The  Religious Divide:  Why Religion Seems  to be Thriving in the  United States and
Waning in Europe,  in Jeffrey  Kopstein & Sven Steimno,  Growing Apart: America and Europe in the Twenty-
First  Century 24 (Cambridge  U.  Press 2007).  Compare Harry Anthony Patrinos, Private Provision and Public
Finance:  Education  in  the  Netherlands,  http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/CHEPublication.nsf/0/
9f1 8f7b54fb3b98585256c2c005e2cc3/$FILE/Netherands%20Private%2Provision%20and%2Public%20Fi
nance.pdf (July 2002)  with Christian  Smith,  American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving (U.  Chicago
Press  1998).  The thriving  Catholic institutions  are particularly  interesting,  given the  assertion that the Blaine
Amendments  embody  anti-Catholic  animus.  See  Mary  J.  Oates,  The Catholic Philanthropic Tradition in
America (Indiana  U.  Press  1995).
98.  Some suggest that the separationist  tradition has also  contributed,  perhaps ironically,  to the strong  role
of religious  groups  in  American  politics  which  in  turn  sustain distinctive  American  approaches  to the  state's
relationship with religion:
[A]  secular  state  and  a  religious  polity,  they  are  contingently  compatible  in  the  sense  that each
depends  upon the  other.  Thus,  we can  have highly  vocal  and widely  mobilized  religious politics
precisely because  there  is  a  separation  of church and  state  where  the actual  affairs  of government
are  concerned.  At the same time, that same separation  would be intolerable if there were not ample
opportunity  elsewhere  in the  society to exercise  and express one's religious preference-or  lack of
one.
N.J.  Demerath  & Karen  S.  Straight, Religion, Politics, and the State: Cross-Cultural  Observations,  47  Cross
Currents  16  (1997)  (available at  http://www.crosscurrents.org/Demerath.htm).  See also N.J.  Demerath & Rhys
H.  Williams, A Bridging of  Faiths.  Religion and Politics in a New England City (Princeton U. Press  1992).
99.  See generally Anthony  Bryk,  Valerie  Lee  & Peter Holland, Catholic Schools and the Common Good
(Harvard U.  Press 1993).
100.  Demerath & Straight, supra  n. 98.
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religion  clause  and  federalism  precedents  to  mandate  inclusion  of religious  schools  in
programs providing public  aid to secular schools.  Caution is due especially now, as  the
country journeys through  shifting waters on the treatment  of religion in public  life.10 1
Respect  for  stare  decisis  as  a  principle  means  respecting  individual  and  social
reliance  on  past precedent.  This  means  that  a new precedent  should not unleash  rapid
expansion  of the  new  development.  Caution  is  especially  warranted  here,  given  the
many  open questions  in Establishment  and Free  Exercise jurisprudence  and the  risk of
the  cumulative  impact  of  greater  numbers  of  students  schooled  in  separate  (and
potentially  antagonistic)  religious  traditions.  Together,  stare  decisis  and  the  religion
clauses  suggest  that  courts  now should  leave  room for  state-level  experimentation  and
variety  rather than a uniform  national  solution on  the  issue  of compelled public  aid to
religious schools. 102  Because the ground rules of public funding shape the link between
schooling  and  an  inclusive  society  and,  in  turn,  the prospects  for  democratic  vitality,
individual  liberty,  and  mutual  tolerance,  the  constitutional  treatment  of public  aid to
religious  schools should avoid radical and rapid shifts.
Hence,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has  directed, 1 0 3  courts  should  permit  government
programs  that  choose  to  include  religious  schools  within  larger  aid  programs-if the
other conditions  of individual choice or entirely secular content are  met.  But these new
precedents  should  not be  read so  aggressively  as to  require public  support  of religious
schools  when states  or localities  pursue school  choice  reforms  or other forms  of school
aid.  That requirement  would demand  considerably  new readings  of the Free  Exercise
Clause,  freedom of speech, or  equal protection;  such a requirement  would overturn the
state  constitutional provisions-by  some counts,  in thirty-seven  states 1 04  banning  direct
aid to religious schools.
Letting  states  and localities  either include  or exclude  religious  schools  in  general
101.  See Andrew  Sullivan,  How Fundamentalism  Is Splitting the GOP: Crisis of Faith, 232  New Republic
16  (May  2,  2005);  Richard  Allen  Greene,  Religion  and Politics  in  America,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/3658172.stm  (last updated  Sept. 15,  2004);  Scott Keeter, Election '06: Big Changes in Some Key
Groups,  http://pewresearch.org/pubs/93/election-06-big-changes-in-some-key-groups  (Nov.  16,  2006);  Pew
Forum,  Religion and the 2006 Elections, http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DoclD=174  (accessed  Mar.  3,
2008)  (reporting  findings  of  religiously-based  political  divisions  from  two previous  Pew  Research  Center
analyses);  Greg  Smith  et  al.,  Religious  Groups  View  the  2006  Election,  http://pewresearch.org/
pubs/99/religious-groups-react-to-the-2006-election  (Nov.  27,  2006).  The trend  is  very recent  or  else  social
scientists disagree  about the  trend.  See Andrew  Kohut et al.,  The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing
Role  in  American Politics (Brookings  Instn.  Press  2000).  American  political  conflict  over  secular  versus
religious values  informed  grassroots  politics  both  before  and  after Roe v.  Wade.  See Robert  Post  &  Reva
Siegel,  Roe  Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42  Har. Civ.  Rights-Civ.  Libs. L.  Rev.  373
(2007).
102.  Cf.  Sunstein,  supra  n.  85;  Cass  Sunstein,  Burkean  Minimalism,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=880121  (Jan.  2006).  A  critic  may  condemn  forms of judicial  minimalism  as  unduly
conservative  and complacent,  see Sheldon Gelman,  The Hedgehog, the Fox, and  the Minimalist: Review of  One
Case at a Time, 89  Geo. L.J.  2297 (2001), but case-by-case  consideration  of issues  on the  cusp of conflictual
values and doctrines could  instead be devoted to preserving dynamism.
103.  Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
104.  The Becket Fund  for Relig. Liberty, supra n. 48; The Becket  Fund for Relig. Liberty,  What Are Blaine
Amendments? http://blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html  (accessed Mar.  3, 2008).  "The  Becket Fund  for
Religious Liberty is a nonprofit, nonpartisan,  interfaith, public interest  law firm dedicated to protecting the  free
expression  of  all  religious  traditions."  The  Becket  Fund  for  Relig.  Liberty,  About  Us,  http://
www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/82.html?PHPSESSID=deafed85c23elda5b30fe94ealele84b  (accessed
Mar. 3, 2008).
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aid programs also requires  preserving the  "play-in-the joints"  between the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause.  Preserving respect for precedents  halting direct aid to
religious  schools demands a cautious  reading of recent judicial decisions  so that both the
old  and  new  decisions  receive  their  due.  Permitting  states  to  experiment  requires
forgoing the uniformity and conclusiveness of a single federal  decision.
VIII. IN PRAISE OF PARTICULARIZED  INCREMENTALISM
The  puzzles  addressed  here  remain  puzzling.  I  take  heart  from  the  surprising
convergence  in the analysis  offered  here with  Larry Tribe's analysis of his  three linked
riddles.  Although  he  addressed  the  very  difficult  puzzles  of  childhood,  suspect
classifications, and conclusive presumptions, he concluded that individualized judgments
about equality claims about particular children offered  the best avenue  for navigating the
difficulties  he examined,  especially in  a period of moral  flux. 105  Similarly,  I  conclude
here  that  the  Supreme  Court  should  resist  an  across-the-board  solution  and  allow
individual  states either to ban funding of religious schools or to include  those  schools in
general  funding programs.
Even more affirming of the approach  taken here are Professor Tribe's reflections  in
his grand treatise about constitutional and historical change.  The Constitution is binding
but  its  meaning  must  reflect  a  "historically  connected  set  of processes,"  and  "deep
puzzles of continuity and  linkage;"'106  each  new  generation becomes "not  only  auditors
but  authors  of  our  own  constitutional  rules  and  limits,",10 7  including  the  choice  to
remain--or not to remain-faithful  to the Constitution. 108  Shifts  in historical practices
can  expose  doctrinal  categories  as  artificial  and  in  need  of  change.
10 9  No  doubt
cognizant of the  irony,  Professor Tribe  turns to  the historic  authority  of Justice  Oliver
Wendell  Holmes,  Jr.,  to  acknowledge  the  inevitable  contribution  of  present-day
interpreters  to the meaning and terms of the Constitution:
[W]hen  we  are dealing with words  that are also a constituent act,  like the Constitution  of
the United States,  we must realize that they have called into life a being the development  of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was
enough  for them  to realize  or to  hope that  they  had  created  an organism;  it has  taken  a
105.  See Tribe, supra n. 1, at 35.  Tribe argues  that some age-based rules should give way to rebuttal through
individualized  hearings if the rule involves  "(1)  the deprivation  of liberties ordinarily deemed fundamental  and
(2)  the  presence  of moral  transition-at  least  if coupled with self-preserving  institutional  unresponsiveness."
Id. at  35.  Again,  with parallels  to  the  inquiry here,  Tribe  embraces  "tentative,  ad  hoc  approaches"  where
questions  seem  unanswerable  at  present  so  that  courts  may  "facilitate,  and  take  part  in,  the  evolution  of
moral-and thus legal-consensus."  Id. at 36-37.
106.  Laurence  Tribe, American Constitutional  Law 21  (3d ed.,  Foundation Press 2000).
107.  Id.  at 24.
108.  Id.
109.  Id. at 70  (discussing  interpretations  of the Commerce  Clause).  For  Professor Tribe,  encounters  with
social,  technological,  and  legal change  should  turn  the search  for  constitution  continuity  reaches  to  general
purposes and  goals.  While  acknowledging  new constitutional questions  posed by the interet and  computers,
Professor Tribe wrote: "The text used  by the Constitution's authors and ratifiers does not exhaust the values our
Constitution recognizes,"  and he proposed a new amendment  to convey that "[t]he technologies familiar to the
Constitution's  authors  and ratifiers  similarly do  not exhaust  the  threats  against  which  the  Constitution's  core
values must be protected."  Laurence  H.  Tribe, Keynote Address,  The Constitution in Cyberspace (Burlingame,
Cal., Mar. 26-28, 1991)  (emphasis in original) (available at http://www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html).
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century and  has cost their successors  much sweat and  blood to prove  that they  created  a
nation.  The case before us must be considered  in the light of our whole experience  and not
110
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Thus,  concludes  Tribe,  "any  interpretive  method  necessarily  reflects  the  embrace  of
some substantive values not necessarily and unambiguously enacted by the constitutional
text."1 11  Surely  this method would push for  consideration of the cumulative  effects  of
its  own  applications,  and  resist  the  calls  completely  to  segregate  legal  doctrine  and
policy. 112   Constitutional  doctrine  is  not  a  straight-jacket  but  instead  a  tool  for
addressing  complex  difficulties  in  light  of past  resolutions  of potentially  analogous
difficulties,  and  the  normative  commitments  of  past  and  future  generations.  This
remains  a task  for judges who may be influenced  by  popular debates  but who  must, in
the  end,  do  their  best  to  interpret  the  Constitution  in  light  of  text,  traditions,  and
purposes. 113
Perhaps, then,  it is not  surprising  that Laurence Tribe,  the treatise-writer, asserted
little  coherence  in constitutional law beyond  consistently conflicting  tendencies. 114  The
constitutionalism  that  he  salutes-and  the  constitutionalism  that  this  article  means  to
advance-keeps  the process of debate over complex and conflictual  values going rather
than  shutting it down.  This means  harnessing difficult puzzles  for their stimulation and
resisting the temptation to close off avenues  of analysis and competing sources of norms
and  decisions.11 5   All-things-considered  approaches  and  individualized  decisions  are
110.  Mo.  v. Holland,  252  U.S. 416, 433  (1920)  (interpreting  the Tenth  Amendment  to  permit the  national
government to enter into a treaty despite  objection by a state and in contrast with prior understandings).
111.  Tribe, supra n. 83, at 71.
112.  Id.  (discussing consideration  of effects  of potential  Establishment  Clause  interpretation on American
schooling and society).
113.  Thus, mass movements  and intellectual  debate  outside of courts  may be helpful,  see Robert  C. Post  &
Reva B.  Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism  and Section Five Power: Policentric  Interpretation  of  the Family
and Medical Leave Act,  112  Yale L.J.  1943  (2003),  but  the judicial task  of constitutional  adjudication must
remain as a potential bulwark against popular views.  See David J. Barron, A Rejoinder  from Professor  Barron,
http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/09/barron_02.html  (Sept.  18,  2006);  David  J.  Barron,  What's  Wrong with
Conservative Constitutionalism?  Two  Styles  of Progressive Constitutional Critique and the  Choice They
Present,  http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/07/barron01  .html (Sept.  18, 2006).
114.  In explaining his decision to stop work on his constitutional law treatise, Tribe explained:
It's  always possible  simply to give  an  accurate  account  of Supreme  Court decision  after  decision
and  to  string the  decisions  together  in the  form  of approximate  black  letter  rules  and  underlying
rationales,  but  it  was  never  my  thought  that  a  treatise  of  that  sort  was  particularly  useful  in
constitutional  law, or at  least it wasn't the  kind of thing I tried  to write  in  1978 and  again in  1988,
when the  second edition came  out, or  in 2000, when  the first part of the third edition  came out.  I
was  interested,  rather,  in  presenting  a  coherent  picture  of constitutional  law  as  a  whole,  even
recognizing  that it's  never  wholly coherent,  that  there are  always  conflicting  tendencies,  and that
any body of doctrine that  is the  vector sum of nine arrows pulling in somewhat different  directions
will always represent some kind of compromise.
Interview  by  Robb  London  with  Laurence  Tribe  (posted  Sept.  13,  2005)  (available  at  http://
www.law.harvard.edu/news/tribe/).
115.  For a similar set of commitments  stemming from concerns about  religious and normative meaning,  see
Robert  M.  Cover,  The Supreme Court 1982  Term: Foreward: Nomos  and Narrative,  97  Harv.  L.  Rev. 4,  16
(1983).  For critical views whose  very existence  might delight a pluralist like Cover, see Thom Brooks, Let a
Thousand Nomoi  Bloom?  Four Problems with  Robert Cover's Nomos  and Narrative, 2006  Issues  Leg.
Scholarship  5  (2006),  http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l071&context-ils;  Judith  Resnik,
Living Their Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17  Yale J.L. & Humanities  17
(2005).
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problematic  because  they  are  unpredictable  and yet  they  seem  to  characterize  lay  and
expert  views  of wisdom. 116  Particularized  case-by-case  judicial  attention  can  include
assessment of the cumulative  impact of religious schooling on the character of the nation
and  the  predicates  for  inclusive  democracy  as  well  as  the  balance  between  state
prerogatives  and  federal  demands.  Even  though  case-by-case  decision-making  allows
uncertainty  and  preserves  tensions  between  lines  of  doctrine  on  potential  collision
courses with one another, it also  permits law to evolve  with practical  responsiveness  to
the multiple priorities relevant to religion, schooling, and democracy.
116.  See Robert  J. Sternberg,  Wisdom, Intelligence, and Creativity Synthesized (Cambridge  U.  Press 2003);
Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins,  and  Development (Robert J. Steinberg ed.,  Cambridge  U.  Press  1990).
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